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Abstract 
Research shows that changes in our moods can affect our performance on cognitive tasks. Most 
studies to date have used young adults and the interaction between mood, cognitive performance 
and age have rarely been examined. There are age-specific changes in executive functions and 
mood regulation. This study examined the effect of mood on set switching and inhibitory control by 
comparing performances in young and older adults after neutral, positive and negative mood 
inductions using forced cued based switching tasks. In a neutral mood, older adults showed reduced 
set switching abilities and inhibitory control compared to young adults. Consistent with the 
literature, young adults showed reduced switching performance in a positive mood; they made more 
switching errors in a visual switch task. Older participants improved their switching abilities 
following mood inductions in a negative or positive direction when compared to a neutral mood 
induction. The relationship between mood and task switching performance was significant even 
after controlling for working memory, reaction time and inhibitory processes.  Young and older 
adults made different types of errors during the switching task.  Proposed explanations for findings 
are discussed.  
 
Keywords: executive functioning, aging, emotion, mood 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON SET-SWITCHING  v 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Declaration of Originality   iii 
Abstract    iv 
List of Tables    vi 
List of Figures   vii 
List of Appendices  viii 
Acknowledgements    ix 
 
Chapter I 
     Introduction     1 
Emotions and Moods     2  
     Executive Functioning   10 
     Theories of Mood Effects on Cognition   19 
Mood Effects on Executive Functioning   29 
Older Adults   45 
 
Chapter II 
Study    52 
Methodology   58 
 
Chapter III 
Results    73 
Chapter IV 
Discussion  101 
Summary  114 
 
References 116 
Appendices 168 
Vita Auctoris 170 
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON SET-SWITCHING   vi 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Overview of Response Systems, Measures, and Emotional States     6 
Table 2: Participants Demographics    61 
Table 3: Switching Paradigm-Stimulus Materials and Task Set    65 
Table 4: Study Procedure    70 
Table 5: Mean Mood Ratings Following Mood Inductions of  
   Young and Older Adults    75 
Table 6: Average Reaction Times (RT) And Number of Errors During  
   Control Tasks for Young and Older Adults    77 
Table 7: Young and Older Adults Switching Performance Across Mood Inductions     81 
Table 8: Young and Older Adults Average Switch Errors for Verbal Switch 
  Task Across Mood Inductions with Standard Errors and  
  Confidence Intervals                 85 
Table 9: Young and Older Adults Average Switch Cost for Visual Switch Task  
  Across Mood Inductions with Standard Errors and Confidence Intervals          87 
Table 10: Young and Older Adults Inhibition Performance Across Mood Inductions    92 
Table 11: Young and Older Adults Average Inhibition Errors for Verbal Switch Task 
    Across Mood Inductions with Standard Errors and Confidence Intervals          96 
Table 12: Young and Older Adults Average Inhibitory Control for Visual Switch Task 
    Across Mood Inductions with Standard Errors and Confidence Intervals          98 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON SET-SWITCHING  vii 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Switching paradigm response keys   66 
Figure 2: Mood ratings during the experiment for older and young adults    76 
Figure 3: Switching errors in the verbal switch task following mood inductions  
    for young and older adults   80 
Figure 4: Switching errors in the visual switch task following mood inductions  
    for young and older adults   83 
Figure 5: Switching errors in the verbal switch task following mood inductions after  
    controlling for covariates for young and older adults   86 
Figure 6: Inhibition errors in the verbal switch task following mood inductions for  
     young and older adults   91 
Figure 7: Inhibitory control in the visual switch task following mood inductions for 
    young and older adults   93 
Figure 8: Inhibition errors in the visual switch task following mood inductions for 
      young and older adults   94 
Figure 9: Inhibtion errors in the verbal switch task following mood inductions 
      after controlling for covariates for young and older adults   97 
Figure 10: Inhibitory control in the visual switch task following mood inductions  
      after controlling for covariates for young and older adults   99 
 
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON SET-SWITCHING  viii 
 
 
List of Appendices 
Appendix A: Mood Questionnaire 168 
Appendix B: Computer Task Questionnaire 169 
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON SET-SWITCHING  ix 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
My advisor: Dr. Christopher A. 
My committee: Dr. Anne B., Dr. Jamie C., & Dr. Carlin M.  
My Windsor family: Cristina A., Joanna H,. Kristen K., Laura K., Tara M., Elisabeth M., Ashley P.,  
        Vilija P., Alma R., Terry S., & Kathy W. 
My biological family: Susanna C., Arthur C., Raymond C. & Yee M.,  
My husband: Richard Y.
  
 
1 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
 Normal variations in our emotions, such as feeling sad or happy, influence the way 
we think and process information.  For example, small changes in mood among healthy 
individuals have been shown to impact memory (Kliegel et al. 2005; Forgas, Goldenberg, 
& Unkelbach, 2009; Moore & Oaksford, 2002), attention (Rowe, Hirsh, Anderson, & 
Smith, 2007) and creativity (Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002; Vosburg, 1998).  
Mood changes have also been found to impact executive functions (Mitchell & Phillips, 
2007).  Executive functions have been defined as a set of higher order neurocognitive 
processes that allow organisms to make choices and engage in purposeful, goal-directed 
and future oriented behaviours (Suchy, 2009).  They are considered to be higher-level 
processes that facilitate adaption to new or complex situations when highly practiced 
cognitive abilities or behaviour no longer suffice (Collette, Hogge, Salmon, & Van der 
Linden, 2006).  These higher order cognitive processes encompass lower level cognitive 
processes such as visual perception, auditory perception, and attention.  It has been 
argued that the effect of mood on executive functioning may underlie mood effects on 
other cognitive domains such as memory, reasoning, and creativity (Ashby, Isen, & 
Turken, 1999; Dalgleish et al., 2007; De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008; Oaksford, Morris, 
Grainger, & Williams, 1996).  Any factor that affects aspects of cognition crucial for 
everyday functioning deserves systematic investigation (Mitchell & Phillips, 2007).  
 Evidence for the relationship between mood and executive functions has been 
shown in studies of individuals with mood disorders.  For example, depressed patients 
demonstrated reduced working memory (Moritz et al., 2002; Harvey et al., 2004), set-
shifting abilities (Austin et al., 1999), inhibitory control (Langenecker et al., 2005) and 
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cognitive flexibility (Fossati, Amar, Raoux, Ergis, & Alliaire, 1999) compared to non-
depressed individuals.  Patients with bipolar disorder showed executive impairments in 
inhibitory control (Brooks et al., 2006; McGrath, Scheldt, Welham, & Clair, 1997), 
cognitive flexibility (Borkowska & Rybakowski, 2001; Frangou, Donaldson, Hadjulis, 
Landau, & Goldstein, 2005) and verbal fluency (Borkowska & Rybakowski, 2001; 
Martinez-Aran et al., 2002). Taken together, the current literature suggests that emotion 
plays a role cognitive functioning.  Emotional processing involves the prefrontal cortex 
and anterior cingulate cortex, which are brain areas also important for executive 
functioning (Collette et al., 2005).   
  In the next sections, literature reviews on the definition, measurement and 
neuroanatomy of emotions and executive functioning are presented.  Then, the theories 
proposed to explain the effect of mood on cognitive functioning are examined before 
exploring the specific research pertaining to mood effects on executive functioning.  The 
current literature indicates a gap in knowledge regarding how age and mood interacts to 
impact performance on executive functioning.  Changes in frontal lobe functioning have 
been proposed to explain age and mood related deficits in executive functioning 
(Brickman et al., 2007; West, 1996; 2001).  Research on the changes associated with 
aging are also reviewed, particularly with regard to emotional and executive functioning.   
  
Emotions and Moods 
Definition and Concept of Emotions 
Emotions have been defined as feelings, of shifts in the control of behaviour and 
thought, of involuntary and impulsive behaviours, of emergence or tenacity of beliefs, of 
changes in an individual’s relationship with the environment, and of physiological 
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changes not caused by physical conditions (Frijda, 2000).  The phenomenon of emotions 
has been heavily debated and can be loosely categorized into two perspectives.  The first 
perspective describes emotion as discrete and natural, and proposes that each emotion is 
associated with a unique experience (Christie & Friedman, 2004; Ekman, Levenson, & 
Friesen, 1983; Izard, 1992; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987).  For example, Ekman (1992) 
proposed that there are basic, universal emotions such as happiness, sadness, anger, fear 
and disgust.  Each emotion involves specific cognitive, behavioural and physiological 
components (Winkielman, Knutson, Paulus, & Trujillo, 2007).  Cognitive components are 
changes in perception and attention related to emotion.  Behavioural components refer to 
emotion-activated motor programs or action.  Physiological components are changes in 
bodily and brain responses, such as hormones, cardiovascular, and subcortical changes, 
associated with emotion.  Some researchers suggest that each emotion is the result of 
people’s appraisal of events occurring in the environment that are significant for them 
(Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Scherer, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985; Weiner, 1985).  For example, fear or fright is due to imminent threat unexpected in 
the environment when one has low coping abilities; sadness is when one does not achieve 
goals; and happiness is a result of success in achieving goals (Scherer, 1997).  
Alternatively, the dimensional perspective argues that emotions can be organized 
according to underlying factors such as valence, arousal, and motivational state (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998; Russell & Barrett, 1999; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 
1999).  The argument for a dimensional view rather than discrete emotions is supported 
by meta-analyses of peripheral nervous system patterns, neuroimaging data, and studies 
of intercorrelations among emotional experiences, which find evidence for only two 
factors of emotions: valence/motivation and intensity/arousal (Barrett, 2006; Mauss & 
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Robinson, 2009; Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005).  Facial behaviours, reports of 
emotional experience, and peripheral nervous system activity show strong associations 
for the emotional properties of valence and intensity (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & 
Hamm, 1993).  In addition, meta-analyses fail to find distinct patterns of peripheral and 
central nervous system responses for basic discrete emotions (Cacioppo, Berntson, 
Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito, 2000).  
 According to the dimensional view, arousal or intensity refers to a hedonically 
undifferentiated state of general activation ranging from low to high (Watson et al., 
1999).  The other factor is either emotion valence or motivation, depending upon the 
particular theory.  Valence refers to the hedonic dimension of a state, either positive and 
pleasurable, or negative and displeasure (Winkielman et al., 2007).  This perspective 
views emotions as basic evaluations signaling good or bad.  Motivation, on the other hand 
is characterized by people’s behaviour towards stimuli and there are two types of 
motivation: approach or avoidance.  Approach motivation is characterized by a tendency 
to approach stimuli whereas avoidance motivation is characterized by a tendency to avoid 
stimuli (Davidson, 1992).  Watson and colleagues (1999) labeled the avoidance system as 
behavioral inhibition system (BIS) and the approach system as behavioral facilitation 
system (BFS).  In behavioral terms, the BIS is working to keep the organism out of 
danger and to help the organism avoid aversive stimuli.  Activity in the BIS focuses 
maximum attention on analyzing environmental stimuli, especially novel stimuli that 
could potentially signal danger and motivates the organism to move cautiously until 
safety is indicated.  In contrast, the BFS directs organisms towards situations and 
experiences that may yield pleasure or reward.  Activity in the BFS aims to increase goal-
directed behaviours (Watson et al., 1999).  In general, positive emotions are linked to 
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BFS and negative emotions are linked to BIS.  There are, however, exceptions for the 
relationship between mood and behavioural motivation.  For example, anger is not always 
associated with withdrawal and has been found to be an approach emotion (Yan & 
Dillard, 2010). 
Some researchers consider arousal as a separate variable from valence (Russell, 
1980) whereas others view arousal as variations in the activation of valence (Watson et 
al., 1999).  Using a dimensional approach, a circumplex model of affect has been 
proposed, which states that all emotions arise from these two fundamental 
neurophysiologic systems: valence – a pleasure-displeasure continuum and arousal - a 
low to high continuum (Russell, 1980).  These two dimensions were placed in a 
circumplex model like a compass. The horizontal dimension was the pleasure-displeasure 
continuum and the vertical dimension was the arousal-sleep continuum. Four other 
variables were included that define the quadrants: excitement, depression, distress, and 
contentment (Russell, 1980).  Watson and Tellegen (1985) revised the circumplex model 
with a circular structure by depicting the four bipolar dimensions that are spaced 45 
degrees apart including: pleasantness (happy vs. sad), positive affect (excited vs. 
sluggish), engagement (aroused vs. still) and negative affect (distressed vs. relaxed). 
Watson and Tellegen emphasized the importance of negative and positive affect in 
addition to the basic structure Russell proposed.  
In addition to the different conceptualizations of emotions, there are also a variety 
of different ways to measure emotions.  Assessment techniques to measure emotions can 
be categorized into three types: 1. language-based such as self report of experience, 
speech patterns, and communication expressions; 2. behavioural displays such as facial 
expressions and behavioural patterns including flight or fight; and 3. physiological signs 
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from hormones, heart rate, and autonomic changes such as blood pressure, skin 
temperature and conductance (for review see, Larsen & Prizmic-Larsen, 2006; Mauss & 
Robinson, 2009; see Table 1 for overview of emotion measurement).  These different 
measurements of emotions have been criticized to be heavily influenced by societal and 
cultural factors (Barrett, 2006; McConatha et al., 1994; Shweder & Haidt, 2000).  The 
available body of evidence suggests that there is no clear, objective way to measure the 
experience of emotion using any single measurement (Barrett, 2006; Mauss & Robinson, 
2009) and that multiple methods are needed to adequately examine the multi-faceted 
nature of emotions (Larsen & Prizmic-Larsen, 2006).  
 
Table 1 
Overview of Response Systems, Measures, and Emotional states 
___________________ ________________________________________________ 
Response system    Measure 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Subjective experience   Self-report 
Peripheral physiology   Autonomic nervous system (ANS) measures 
Affect-modulated startle   Startle response magnitude  
Central physiology   EEG, fMRI, PET  
Behaviour     Vocal characteristics: Amplitude, pitch 
Facial behaviour: Observer ratings; EMG  
Whole body behaviour  Observer ratings 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Mood vs. Emotion 
 Although the terms ‘mood’ and ‘emotion’ have been used interchangeably in 
everyday discourse, the term ‘emotion’ is differentiated from ‘mood’ by various factors in 
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scientific literature.  Emotions are relatively intense, brief states whereas mood refers to 
low intensity, diffuse and relatively long lasting states (Winkielman et al., 2007).  Moods 
have no salient antecedent or clear cause, and little cognitive content.  Emotions have a 
definite cause and clear cognitive content (Forgas, 1995).  Moods generally last for 
minutes or hours.  On the other hand, emotions last for typically seconds or a fraction of a 
second (Mitchell & Phillips, 2007).   
Neuroanatomy of Emotions 
The question of where emotion or mood processing occurs in the brain has been a 
topic of debate for decades.  The work of Papez has been particularly influential in this 
regard.  Papez (1937) theorized that a complex emotion processing circuit exists within 
the hypothalamus, anterior thalamic nucleus, hippocampus, and cingulate cortex.  The 
hypothalamus was thought to be the structure that assigns incoming stimuli with 
emotional significance whereas the cingulate cortex was thought to be involved in the 
experience of emotion.  This circuit was later revised and relabeled as the limbic system, 
a system that includes the amygdala, hypothalamus, anterior thalamic nucleus, 
hippocampus, and insular cortex (MacLean, 1952).  
Researchers now generally agree that several of the limbic system structures play 
an important role in emotional processing.  The amygdala has been found to detect and 
recognize emotionally salient stimuli (Davis & Whalen, 2001; Morris, Frith, Perrett, & 
Rowland, 1996). The amygdala is located in the medial temporal lobe, anterior to the 
hippocampus.  Typically, processing information from the environment begins at the 
sensory organs and then transferred to the sensory specific nuclei of the thalamus. 
Subsequently, information is either relayed to the sensory cortex before transferring to the 
amygdala, or the thalamus passes information directly to the amygdala (LeDoux, 1995).  
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The amygdala incorporates three distinct groups of cells: lateral, basal, and central nuclei.  
In general, the lateral nucleus receives information from the thalamus, hippocampus, or 
cortex and then transmits information to the basal and accessory basal nuclei where it is 
integrated with information coming from different areas of the brain (Davis & Whalen, 
2001; LeDoux, 1995).  Information is then transmitted to the central nucleus where it is 
output to the prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, striatum, central nucleus, anterior cingulate, 
and the lateral bed nucleus of the stria terminalis.  The amygdala and its connections are 
involved in emotional arousal, processing positive and negative emotions, and memory 
consolidation of emotional events (Baxter & Murray, 2002; Garavan, Pendergrass, Ross, 
Stein, & Risinger, 2001; LeBar & Cabeza, 2006; Liberzon, Phan, Decker, & Taylor, 
2003; Siebert, Markowitsch, & Bartel, 2003).  
 In addition to the amygdala, the reticular formation (RF) has been suggested to 
regulate arousal levels of the central nervous system through its connections with the 
limbic system and thalamus (Heilman, 1997).  The RF is located within the brain stem 
with its cell bodies located in the midbrain and pons.  The ascending neural projections 
from the RF are composed largely of neurons producing the excitatory neurotransmitter 
glutamate.  Neuroimaging research found that thalamic and frontomedial activity is 
associated with arousal changes (Anders, Lotze, Erb, Grodd & Birbaumer, 2004).  Heller 
(1993) suggested that the parietotemporal region of the right hemisphere modulates 
emotion arousal whereas the frontal regions modulate the valence dimensions of emotion.  
Activation in the temporal and parietal areas has been associated with emotional arousal 
(Anders et al., 2004; Foster & Harrison, 2002) and increased activation in the frontal 
cortex occurs when individuals are induced in a positive or negative mood (Baker, Frith 
& Dolan, 1997; Lane et al., 1997; Steele & Lawrie, 2004).  Additionally, activity in the 
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON SET-SWITCHING   
 
9 
medial and lateral prefrontal cortex increased when people consciously altered their 
appraisals of aversive stimuli and ventral lateral prefrontal cortex activation was inversely 
correlated with the activation of the amygdala (Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; 
Phan et al., 2005).  In a review of neuroimaging studies, Quirk and Beer (2006) found that 
activation of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and inhibition of the amygdala are 
involved in regulating emotions, especially suppressing negative emotions.  
Furthermore, research shows that positive and negative emotions rely on 
independent neural mechanisms.  Happiness and joy activate the basal ganglia (Phan, 
Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002) and are marked by increased dopamine levels in the 
brain, especially in the anterior cingulate cortex (Ashby et al., 1999) and ventral striatum 
(Burgdorf & Panksepp, 2006; Drevets et al., 2001).  Support for the association of 
dopamine in positive mood comes from studies showing amphetamine injections, which 
increase dopamine in the ventral striatum, were correlated with self-reported positive 
arousal (Drevets et al., 2001; Volkow, Wang, Fowler, Logan, Gatley et al., 1999).  On the 
other hand, negative moods, such as sadness and fear, have been associated with activity 
in the subcallosal cingulate cortex and amygdala (Mayberg et al., 1999; Phan et al., 2002) 
and low levels of serotonin in the prefrontal cortex (Arango, Underwood, & Mann, 1997; 
Beevers, Scott, McGeary, & McGeary, 2009; Bhagwagar, Whale, & Cowen, 2002).  This 
suggests that positive and negative emotions are relatively orthogonal dimensions, rather 
than opposites on a single continuum, because positive and negative emotions are 
processed by distinct cortical regions. 
There are two main theories for the lateralization of emotions in the brain.  Based 
on the right hemisphere model, the right hemisphere is specialized for general emotional 
processing regardless of valence (Borod, 1992; Borod et al., 1998; Hagemann, Hewig, 
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Naumann, Seifert, & Bartussek, 2005).  In this model, the right hemisphere is for 
automatic emotional processing whereas the left hemisphere is for emotional control and 
modulation (Qinqxia & Dejun, 2004).  General emotional processing has been suggested 
to involve the posterior regions of the right hemisphere (Gur, Skolnick, & Gur, 1994; 
Heller, 1993; Heller, Nitschke, & Lindsay, 1997).  On the other hand, the valence model 
states that positive or approach emotions are associated with relatively greater left 
hemisphere activity and negative or withdrawal emotions are associated with relatively 
greater right hemisphere activity (Coan & Allen, 2004; Davidson, 1992; Davidson, 
Ekman, Saron, Senulis, & Friesen, 1990).  Specifically, Davidson (1992) proposed that 
the left frontal area is involved in a system facilitating positive approach behaviour to 
appetitive stimuli whereas the right frontal area is involved in a system facilitating 
negative withdrawal behaviour from aversive stimuli.   
 
Executive Functioning 
Definition and Measurement 
 The scientific literature contains multiple definitions of executive functioning and 
there is no universally accepted operational definition.  Broadly speaking, the term 
executive functioning is a set of higher order neurocognitive processes that allow 
organisms to make choices and engage in purposeful, goal-directed and future oriented 
behaviour (Suchy, 2009).  Many higher order cognitive abilities are subsumed to be 
executive functioning including planning, sustained attention, working memory, problem 
solving, sequencing, response selection, behavioural control, inhibition of pre-potent 
responses, initiation of behaviour, planning of action, hypothesis generation, cognitive 
flexibility, judgment and decision making, and feedback management (Collette et al., 
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2006; Mitchell & Phillips, 2007; Suchy, 2009).  Generally, executive function has been 
conceptualized as a top-down processor that modulates or controls lower level cognitive 
processes.  
Although the umbrella term of executive functioning implies there is an 
underlying factor common to all domains, correlations between different aspects of 
executive functioning are often low or insignificant (Friedman et al., 2006; Lehto, 1996; 
Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000; Salthouse, Atkinson, & Berish, 
2003).  The multifaceted nature of executive functions makes it difficult to measure 
adequately.  Many different clinical measures have been developed to examine the 
various subdomains of executive functions.  There is no single measure that adequately 
accounts for all aspects of executive functioning and there is no clear consensus on what 
tasks should be used to measure executive function (Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006).  
Additionally, there is an issue of impurity in measurement because executive functions 
must operate on other cognitive functions, such that all executive tasks must involve 
nonexecutive cognitive processes.  Furthermore, many tasks used to measure executive 
function use several different executive function abilities.  Many popular executive 
function tasks have been validated only to the loose criterion of being affected by frontal 
lobe damage and the precise nature of executive processes implicated in the performance 
of these tasks has not been adequately specified (Miyake et al., 2000).  
Theories Conceptualizing Executive Functions 
 One of the earliest conceptualizations of executive functions is from Luria (1973), 
who proposed that the brain is organized into three functional units.  The first unit is for 
regulating arousal and wakefulness, the second unit is for receiving, processing, and 
storing information from the external world, and the third unit is for programming, 
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controlling, and verifying activity.  This latter unit was the ‘executive’ system in the brain 
that allows individuals to engage in higher-level thinking and problem solving.  Luria 
posited that this executive system was likely located in the prefrontal lobe based on 
clinical observations of brain-damaged patients.  
 Norman and Shallice (1986) also suggested an executive system for higher-level 
thinking. Generally, they believed in two different levels of cognitive processing 
depending on task complexity.  When a task is simple, well-learned or rehearsed, the 
brain operates at a lower-level of automatic responding by choosing the appropriate 
response based on activation of a network of schemas, which they called the contention 
scheduling mechanism.  On the other hand, when a task is novel or complex, an 
additional system called the supervisory system is used to select response action.  This 
system is used when there is no available contention scheduling or existing scheduling 
must be overruled.   This supervisory system regulates lower level schemata. 
Similarly, in his theory of working memory, Baddeley (1986) suggested there is a 
central executive for regulating the distribution of resources for two lower level systems.  
In this theory, there are two slave systems for processing and temporarily storing 
information.  The phonological loop is for processing auditory information whereas the 
visuospatial sketchpad is for processing visual information.  Later, Baddeley (1996) 
expanded the role of the central executive to include selective attention to relevant stimuli 
while inhibiting irrelevant stimuli, switching between retrieval plans, dividing attention 
between two different tasks occurring simultaneously, and temporary activation long-term 
memory for attaining information.  
Logan (1985) proposed that our cognitive system has an executive function to 
control and coordinate separate cognitive processes such as encoding, transforming, and 
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recognizing information.  Logan suggested there are four major executive functions when 
performing a task: choosing among different strategies for performing a task; constructing 
the strategy to enable performance of the task; executing and maintaining the strategy to 
perform the task which requires making decisions on what to do next as each step is 
completed; and lastly disengaging strategies.  This last step occurs when the task is 
completed or the goal is no longer relevant or when the individual needs to correct errors; 
therefore it involves monitoring changes in task environment.  
Rabbitt (1997) examined the literature on executive functions in normal and 
clinical populations and reported seven different distinctions executive functions have 
from other non-executive cognitive functions.  Firstly, executive functions deal with 
novel tasks that require us to formulate goals, plan, and choose between alternative 
sequences of behaviour to reach goals, and compare these plans in respect to the relative 
probabilities of success at attaining the chosen goal, to initiate the plan selected and carry 
it through.  Secondly, executive functions require retrieval from long-term memory; it 
involves the efficiency of organized recall of material from memory.  Thirdly, executive 
functions initiate new sequences of behaviour and interrupt other ongoing sequences of 
responses in order to do so.  This involves suppressing or inhibiting automatic and 
habitual responses with task appropriate responses and switching attention to new 
information if necessary.  Executive functions also prevent responses that are 
inappropriate in context; this stems from research showing that patients with frontal lobe 
damage show poor social judgment.  Fifthly, executive functions are responsible for 
strategic allocation and synchronization of responses; this is especially seen in dual task 
performance in which people carry out simultaneous performance of two tasks and must 
switch between the two tasks.  In addition, executive functions monitor performance to 
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detect and correct errors, and to change plans when one is unlikely to succeed with the 
current strategy.  Lastly, Rabbitt pointed out that executive functions enable sustained 
attention over long periods of time.  
Kimberg and Farah (1993) created a model based on the performance of patients 
with frontal damage on four different tasks: a motor sequencing test, the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test, the Stroop Test and a memory for context or source memory task.  These 
authors hypothesized that there are information-specific working memory systems for 
each task, which are specific production systems developed to cope with different 
situations.  This model was created to explain the lack of association between patients’ 
performance deficits and lesions. Changes in working memory systems will result in 
disruption to performance of some tasks while leaving others unaffected. Kimberg, 
D'Esposito and Farrah (1997) updated their model to explain that actions are selected 
based on four different sources of activation: (a) priming effects in which actions taken 
recently are more active; (b) baseline strength in which actions that are used more often 
are more active; (c) inherent level of activation of a working memory element and 
spreading activation from other associated representations; (d) the constant level of 
random noise that contributes to each possible response. Therefore in this model when 
selecting among competing responses, the brain calculates the sum of the sources of 
activation contributing to each potential response and chooses the response with the 
highest level of activation 
 Similar to Kimberg and Farah (1993), Stuss and colleagues (Stuss, 2007; Stuss & 
Alexander, 2000) proposed a model of executive functioning based on research in 
patients with focal frontal lesions.  Stuss proposed there are four different functions of 
frontal lobes: executive cognitive functions that are involved in the control and direction 
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(including planning, switching, and monitoring) of lower-level, more automatic functions; 
behavioural self regulation functions for situations where habit or environmental cues are 
not sufficient to determine the most adaptive response; activation regulating functions 
which initiate behaviour at a level appropriate to the situation and to attain the 
individual’s goals; and metacognitive processes implicated in personality, social 
cognition, and self-awareness.  In a more recent model, Stuss (2011) suggested two main 
processes associated with executive cognitive functions: monitoring of ongoing 
performance and task setting that uses the logic of if-then.  This theory was based on 
neurological findings that these different functions were anatomically related to different 
brain areas of the prefrontal cortex.  
Barkley (1997) defined executive function as major classes of behaviour towards 
oneself used in self regulation.  Self regulation is a response that functions to change the 
probability of future responses to an event and therefore changes the likelihood of a later 
consequence associated with that event.  Barkley proposed that behavioural inhibition 
underlies many executive functions.  Barkley (1997; 2001) defined behavioural inhibition 
as three interrelated process: Inhibition of the previously appropriate response to an event, 
stopping of an ongoing response, and delay in responding and goal directed behaviour 
generated from disruption of competing events and responses.  The ability to use 
behavioural inhibition is important in being able to perform four different executive 
functions: working memory, self-regulation of affect and arousal, internalization of 
speech and reconstitution.  The four executive functions that influence the motor system 
for goal directed behaviour include inhibiting task irrelevant response, generating novel 
complex responses for goal directed responses, maintaining sensitivity to response 
feedback, and assuring task re-engagement following disruption.  Barkley used this 
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theory to describe the evolutionary importance and development of executive functioning 
as well as to conceptualize the response inhibition difficulties in individuals with 
Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD). 
While the conceptualization of executive functions in relation to other cognition 
abilities is still being debated, researchers have attempted to group executive functions 
into meaningful categories.  For example, Baddeley (1996) proposed four different 
executive functions: capacity to allocate resources during simultaneous execution of two 
tasks, capacity to switch retrieval strategies, capacity to selectively attend to one stimulus 
and inhibit disrupting effects of others, and capacity to hold and manipulate information 
stored in long term memory.  Shimamura (2000) also suggested four executive control 
processes underlying the self-regulation of behaviour: selecting, or focusing attention on 
particular subsets of the mental or physical environment; maintaining, or keeping goals or 
other information active in working memory over time; updating, or manipulating the 
contents of working memory; and rerouting or switching from one task or mental set to 
another.  Barkley (2001) suggested six different executive components: volition; planning 
of purposeful, intentional goal directed action; inhibition and resistance to distraction, 
problem solving including strategy development, selection and monitoring; shifting 
actions in order to meet task demands; persistence towards attaining goals; and self 
awareness.   
 Some researchers have attempted to resolve the problem of measurement and 
different conceptualizations of executive functions by employing factor analysis.  This 
statistical method reduces the effects of task impurity and heterogeneity from different 
executive function measures by pooling shared variance from executive function tests.  
Based on factor analytical studies of common executive tasks. Miyake and colleagues 
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(2000) examined the neural correlates of latent domains of executive functioning using an 
undergraduate population and found three latent executive abilities: shifting, updating and 
inhibition.  A confirmatory factor analysis indicated that shifting, updating, and inhibition 
were clearly distinguishable from each other but also share some underlying commonality 
because correlations between them were moderately high.  Miyake and colleagues also 
used a series of structural equation modeling analyses to examine how updating, shifting, 
and inhibition contributed to performance on a number of executive tasks commonly used 
in neuropsychological studies and found that the three variables or combination of them 
contributed significantly to most neuropsychological measures.   
 There is supporting research for Miyake’s three latent variables of executive 
functioning.  Lehto, Juujarvi, Kooistra, and Pulkkinen (2003) used exploratory and 
confirmatory analyses on the performance of various executive functioning measures 
among children aged 8 to 13 years old, and found three interrelated factors similar to 
Miyake’s.  Friedman, Miyake, Robinson, and Hewitt (2011) also found the same three-
factor model in a large twin study with 950 children and adolescent participants.  Using a 
large population of participants aged 20 to 81, Fisk and Sharp (2004) found a factor 
structure broadly consistent with Miyake and colleagues.  Vaughan and Giovanello 
(2010) found a similar three-factor model among older adults using confirmatory factor 
analysis.  Adrover-Roig, Sesé, Barceló, and Palmer (2012) also examined executive 
functioning among older adults using latent variable analysis and found factor structures 
broadly consistent with Miyake et al.’s three-factor model, however, an additional factor 
labeled ‘efficiency of access to long-term memory’, and a mediator factor (‘speed of 
processing’) were also found.  A three-factor solution of working memory, shifting and 
access to long-term memory best described executive functioning among healthy older 
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adults.  Huizinga, Dolan and van der Molen (2006) also found shifting and updating 
factors using confirmatory factor analysis on participants from four different age groups 
(7-, 11-, 15-, and 21-year olds).  In a more recent model, Miyake and Friedman (2012) 
updated the unity/diversity model of executive functioning to include a common 
executive functioning ability, specific updating ability, and a specific shifting ability. The 
inhibition specific ability was taken out of the new model because research showed that 
there was no unique variance left for the inhibition-specific factor once the common 
executive function factor was accounted (Friedman et al., 2011). 
Neuroanatomy of Executive Functions 
 Originally, executive functions were synonymous with the brain’s frontal lobes 
because research demonstrated that patients with frontal lesions showed executive 
function deficits (Strauss et al., 2006; Suchy, 2009).  Current research demonstrates that 
executive function is not exclusively associated with the frontal lobe but involves a neural 
network of multiple brain areas.  Abundant research shows that the neural network of 
executive functions includes the prefrontal area of the brain and anterior cingulate 
(Barbas, 2000; Collette et al., 2006; Gilbert, Gonen-Yaacovi, Benoit, Volle, & Burgess, 
2010; Heyder, Suchan, & Daum, 2004; Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; Sarazin et al., 
1998).  The prefrontal cortex can be divided into three subdivisions: the dorsolateral area, 
which is associated with working memory, the superomedial area including the anterior 
cingulate gyrus, which is associated with sustained attention, response selection and 
motivation, and the ventral area, which is associated with inhibition (Suchy, 2009).  The 
prefrontal cortex controls processes throughout the brain to achieve goals; activity in the 
prefrontal cortex can affect sensory systems, motor systems, and midbrain systems to 
control behaviour (Miller & Cohen, 2001).  Stuss (2011) proposed a network of the 
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frontal lobes associated with different cognitive processing: the superior medial area is 
involved in initiating and sustaining a response (also called energization), the right lateral 
area is for monitoring performance, the left lateral area is for task setting, the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex is for behavioural and emotional self-regulation, and the 
rostral area is for metacognition and integration of all the other different capacities.  In 
addition to the prefrontal area, the parietal lobe has also been shown in neuroimaging 
studies to be involved in different executive functioning tasks (Collette et al., 2006) as 
well as subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia, thalamus, and cerebellum 
(Collette et al., 2006; Heyder et al., 2004; Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2005; Stuss, 2011). 
 
Theories of Mood Effects on Cognition 
Many researchers have attempted to explain the effect of mood on cognition.  
Some theories focus on the processing demands of emotions, also known as capacity 
limitation theories.  Other theories focus on the evolutionary significance emotions have 
for our cognitive functioning and hypothesize different processing styles associated with 
positive and negative mood, referred to collectively as processing style theories.  Lastly, 
the mood as facilitator theory proposes that positive mood will facilitate cognitive 
processes.  The following section will describe these theories. 
Capacity Limitation Theories 
 In the capacity limitation theories (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988), changes in mood 
lead to the activation of associative networks of emotion-related thoughts, which reduce 
the resources available for cognitive task processing.  Emotions activate emotion nodes, 
which then prime the associated network to decrease threshold for emotionally congruent 
cognitive nodes.  Each distinct emotion has a node or unit in memory that collects 
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together many aspects including expressive behaviours, autonomic patterns, evoking 
appraisals, verbal labels, and events in one’s life where that emotion is aroused (Bower, 
1981).  Activation of an emotion node spreads activation throughout memory structures 
connected to it and reduces subsequent excitation required for activation at those event 
nodes.  For example, Wenze, Gunthert, and Forand (2007) found a significant relationship 
between presently occurring negative mood and negative thoughts.  Emotions are also 
associated with emotion-congruent memories and information processing (Bower, 1981; 
Innes-Ker & Niedenthal, 2002; Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Setterlund, 1997); for example 
sad mood produces sad memories.  Seibert and Ellis (1991) found that happy and sad 
mood participants showed greater irrelevant thoughts than control participants and the 
proportion of irrelevant thought was negatively related to memory recall performance. 
These emotion-related thoughts reduce the amount of processing capacity 
available for task-related processes because resources are being used to process one’s 
mood state or other mood congruent task irrelevant information.  For example, 
Schmeichel (2007) found that participants who had performed a working memory task 
(evaluating math equations while remembering target words presented on screen) were 
less successful at inhibiting their emotional expressions while watching a negative 
emotion film afterwards compared to participants who had performed a memory 
maintenance task.  Moreover, participants who were asked to exaggerate facial 
expressions of their emotions while watching happy and disgusting films showed reduced 
performance on a working memory span compared to participants who were not asked to 
exaggerate their emotions.  This suggests that performing an executive functioning task 
undermined later efforts at engaging in emotion control and vice versa, engaging in 
emotional control reduced performance on an executive task.  Given that negative moods 
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are undesirable, people are motivated to reduce or eliminate them by regulating their 
negative mood (Joormann & Siemer, 2004).  Ochsner and colleagues (2004) measured 
prefrontal activity using functional imaging when participants engaged in cognitive 
reappraisal to up- and down-regulate negative emotion generated from viewing negative 
images.  Regulation of emotion activated regions of the lateral prefrontal cortex 
implicated in working memory, the dorsal anterior cingulate implicated in the on-line 
monitoring of performance, and the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex implicated in self-
monitoring and self-evaluation.  Regulation of emotions also modulated amygdala 
activation.  This demonstrates that effective cognitive reappraisal after negative mood 
involves activation of prefrontal systems related to executive functioning and systems that 
appraise the properties of stimuli.  
In summary, capacity limitation theories suggest that negative and positive mood 
would negatively impact cognitive functioning: the greater intensity of emotion arousal, 
the greater performance deficits on cognitive tasks.  In support for emotional arousal 
impacting cognitive processing, Pham (2007) reviewed the literature on emotion and 
cognition and concluded that highly intense negative emotional states interfere with 
reasoning ability because under high activation of negative emotions (e.g. fear), 
behavioural responses are based on quick assessment of diagnostic features of the 
situation rather than careful consideration (Baron, Inman, Kao, & Logan, 1992).  The 
effects of highly intense positive emotional states are less well understood; however, they 
may have less influence on reasoning processes because it requires less behavioural 
adjustment than negative emotions (Pham, 2007).  Generally, positive emotions signify 
safe situations that require little action whereas negative emotions indicate problematic 
situations that require action (Schwarz & Bless, 1991).  
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Processing Style Theories 
The processing style theories examine mood from an evolutionary point of view.  
These theories view mood functioning as information to alert people to safety or threat 
(Schwarz & Bless, 1991).  The threat of danger or problematic situations creates a 
negative mood, prompting people to engage in systematic information processing for 
action to remedy their current situation whereas the signal of safety during positive 
moods prompts people to relax and therefore, they are more likely to explore novel 
pathways and take risks.  Similarly, Fiedler (1988) described positive mood as producing 
a "loosening style" of being creative and intuitive, and negative mood as producing a 
"tightening style” of being systematic and conservative.  Research suggests that positive 
mood led to global processing with broader range of thought action repertoires and 
greater attention scope (Bolte, Goschke, & Kuhl, 2003; Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson & 
Branigan, 2005; Gasper & Clore, 2002).  The greater associations primed in positive 
mood may distract people from careful systematic information processing (Mackie & 
Worth, 1989).  Also, positive mood may lead to increased activation of task irrelevant 
information in working memory, leading to greater flexibility and originality at the cost of 
reduced inhibition for irrelevant information or increased distractibility (Dreisbach & 
Goschke, 2004; Goeleven, De Raedt, & Koster, 2007; Rowe et al., 2007).  Alternatively, 
negative mood has been found to be associated with more localized, focused processing 
as a result of the activation of narrow available action repertoires (Bolte et al., 2003; 
Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005).  Negative mood is also associated with concrete, 
systematic processing rather than heuristic processing (Forgas, 2007), which would serve 
well on executive function tasks that require focused and analytical thought. 
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 Another way of differentiating the processing styles of positive and negative 
mood is assimilation versus accommodation (Fiedler, 2001).  Positive mood supports 
assimilation: a top-down adaptive process which imposes one’s own internal structures 
onto the environment; thus one relies on internal schemas and routines to respond to 
situations.  In contrast, negative mood supports accommodation: a bottom-up process by 
which internal structures are changed because of external constraints; therefore this 
promotes assessing the environment as accurately and carefully as possible.  Negative 
mood indicates a problematic situation and that relying on usual routine may not be 
adaptive; therefore, it is important to pay attention to the specifics of a situation.  Bless 
and colleagues (1996) suggested that when people are in a happy mood, they are more 
likely to rely on their general knowledge structures because these structures are likely to 
serve them well because the situation is benign.  On the other hand, people in a sad mood 
are in a problematic situation and focusing on specific information is more adaptive than 
relying on usual routine and general knowledge structures.  
In support for the predictions of processing style theories, positive mood has been 
associated with using superficial, heuristic categorization such as stereotypes to judge 
people (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; Park and Banaji, 2000; Stroessner & 
Mackie, 1992), categorizing objects more broadly (Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen, 
Niedenthal, & Cantor, 1992), lower likelihood to use rule-based decision strategies to 
maximize outcome in a gambling task (De Vries, Holland, Corneille, Rondeel, & 
Witteman, 2012), committing the fundamental attribution error (Forgas, 1998), relying on 
the ease of access to relevant information and general knowledge structures for judgment 
(Bless et al. 1996; Ruder & Bless, 2003), producing more abstract, less concrete 
arguments (Forgas, 2007), and generating a greater number and more creative answers in 
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response generation tasks (Abele-Brehm, 1992; Hirt, Devers, & McCrea, 2008; Hirt, 
Melton, McDonald, & Harackiewicz, 1996; Phillips, Bull et al., 2002).  Positive mood is 
also associated with using distracting information implicitly (Biss, Hasher, & Thomas, 
2010), greater implicit memory for irrelevant information (Biss & Hasher, 2011) and 
greater processing of spatially adjacent distractors (Rowe et al., 2007); consistent with the 
suggestion that positive mood is associated with increased distractibility.  On the other 
hand, negative mood is associated with greater substantial and systematic information 
processing in persuasion (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Ruder & Bless, 2003; 
Ruys & Stapel, 2008; Sinclair, Mark, & Clore, 1994), decreasing reliance on general, 
easily accessible knowledge structures (Bless et al., 1996; Converse, Lin, Keysar, & 
Epley, 2008), reducing susceptibility to halo effects (Sinclair, 1988), decreasing the 
likelihood of committing the fundamental attribution error (Forgas, 1998), and producing 
attitude change with effective arguments (Forgas, 2007).  
In summary, these processing style theories hypothesize that positive and negative 
mood would have different effects on cognition.  Positive mood would improve 
performance on tasks that require using heuristics, creativity and flexibility.  
Alternatively, negative mood would improve performance on tasks that require focused 
attention and ignoring distractors, and systematic and detailed analysis.  Furthermore, 
Fielder (2001) suggests negative mood calls for accommodative processing focused on 
concrete and external information, and thus is best for dealing with novel, difficult or 
problematic situations.  Positive mood promotes assimilative processing in which 
individuals rely on abstract knowledge structures and heuristics, and is therefore 
appropriate for creative use of abstract, established knowledge structures.  Therefore, 
given that executive measures often use novel, complex tasks, the processing style 
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associated with negative mood would improve performance on such tasks whereas 
positive mood would hinder task performance.  
Mood as Facilitator Theory 
 In contrast to the idea that an assimilation style is associated with positive mood, 
Ashby, Isen, and Turken (1999) suggested that mild positive mood acts as a facilitator for 
cognition.  Specifically, positive mood is proposed to activate positive memories and 
thoughts to help promote flexibility, efficient thinking, and problem solving. 
Neurologically, Ashby and colleagues (1999) suggested that positive mood increases 
dopamine levels in the prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate.  Increases in dopamine 
levels are associated with updating of working memory, which facilitates cognitive 
flexibility and learning (Cohen, Braver, & Brown, 2002).  However, the effect of positive 
mood on cognition depends on motivation.  Positive mood will facilitate cognition if 
motivation for the task is high, as based on the affect maintenance theory (Isen & Geva, 
1987).  That is, people in a positive mood are motivated to spend cognitive effort in 
completing a task if the task has direct bearing on their well-being or the task itself is 
perceived as intrinsically enjoyable because they generally want to maintain their positive 
mood.  Positive mood is often associated with reduced performance and increased 
heuristic processing in research because the tasks measured in a laboratory are 
inconsequential to participants.  On the other hand, people in a positive mood during 
everyday situations will quit using heuristics if it is not working and use systematic 
processing if they are motivated to perform well on the task (Lyubomirsky, King, & 
Diener, 2005).  Therefore, the mood as a facilitator for cognition theory predicts that 
positive mood would improve task performance on important or enjoyable tasks whereas 
it would impair performance on dull and unpleasant tasks.  There are no predictions 
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regarding cognitive performance for negative moods.   
In summary, the capacity limitation theories state that positive and negative mood 
would be associated with reduced cognitive performance and the greater the mood 
arousal, the greater the decline in performance.  The processing style theories suggest that 
positive and negative mood would have different effects on cognition.  Positive mood 
would improve performance on tasks that require using heuristics or abstract general 
knowledge structures, creative thinking and flexibility.  On the other hand, negative mood 
would improve performance on tasks that require focused attention on concrete, external 
information, and systematic and detailed analysis, and for novel, difficult problems.  
Mood as a facilitator for cognition theory predicts that positive mood generally improves 
cognitive performance if individuals find the task important or enjoyable, but decreases 
performance on tasks that are relatively unimportant or boring.  
Factors that Influence the Effects of Mood on Cognition 
Various factors have been found to affect the relationship between mood and 
cognitive task performance.  A factor important in determining task performance is the 
degree of motivation and effort.  Emotions affect motivation by increasing or decreasing 
an individual’s willingness to engage in an effortful task (Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 
1993); motivational principles state that happy people preserve good mood by avoiding 
cognitive effort and sad people increase cognitive effort to improve mood (Isen & Geva, 
1987).  Therefore, people in a positive mood are not motivated to expend cognitive effort 
unless it is called for by other goals (Côtè, 2005).  As such, individuals in a positive mood 
have been found to use greater scrutiny in activity choice than individuals in a negative 
mood (Wegener & Petty, 1994).  Individuals in a happy mood preferred tasks that were 
pleasant and creative (Hirt et al., 2008). 
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The impact of mood on cognition is reduced or eliminated when there is explicit 
motivation for task performance (Ottati, Terkildsen, & Hubbard, 1997).  That is, 
motivation can reduce or eliminate mood effects if, for example, a strong external 
motivator such as a high reward, is provided to participants (Forgas, 1995).  Sansone and 
Harackiewciz (1996) argued that motivation derives not only from the goal that the 
individual wants to achieve, but also from the individual’s phenomenal experience while 
working towards a goal, meaning that the individual’s mood during a task constitutes a 
part of task motivation.  Similarly, the degree of effort required for the task can also affect 
mood such that effortful cognitive tasks reduce mood effects or return induced mood to 
baseline regardless of valence whereas easy tasks do not (Erber & Tesser, 1992; Van 
Dillen, & Koole, 2007). 
Task framing also influences mood effects on cognitive performance.  Friedman, 
Forster and Denzler (2007) found that participants in a positive mood performed better on 
tasks framed as fun and silly and participants in a negative mood performed better on 
tasks framed as serious and important.  Martin, and colleagues (1993) found that 
participants whose attention was focused on their enjoyment persisted on the task longer 
and showed better performance when in a happy mood whereas participants whose 
attention focused on the adequacy of their performance persisted on the task longer and 
showed better performance when in a sad mood.  A study performed by Hirt et al. (1996) 
found that participants in a happy mood performed better and spent longer time on tasks 
when asked to stop when they were no longer interested in the task but they spent less 
time on tasks when asked to stop when they thought it was a good time to stop.   
Research demonstrates that interest generally increases task performance (Frost & 
Mahoney, 1978). Task interest plays a role in the effect of mood on cognition.  Abele-
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Brehm (1992) found that positive mood was associated with greater fluency regardless of 
task interest whereas negative mood was associated with greater fluency only when there 
was a high instrumental interest compared to neutral mood.  In addition, research has 
found that task interest levels partially mediated the effect of mood on task performance 
(Hirt et al., 1996) in which initial task interest resulted in more response generation from 
participants.  
Given that all these factors impact mood and cognition, Forgas (1995; 2002) 
proposed the affect infusion model.  According to this model, there are various factors in 
deciding which strategy individuals use to make social judgments such as the target’s 
familiarity, complexity, and personal relevance, and the judge’s specific motivation and 
cognitive capacity.  Although this theory is for social judgments, the model can be 
applied in a similar manner for other aspects of cognitive functioning.  For example, 
motivated processing for preexisting goals uses predetermined, selective and directed 
information search patterns and integration strategies.  This is generally used when there 
are strong and specific motivation pressures for the outcome to be achieved.  In this case, 
the motivation consequences of moods are more subtle and indirect, such as mood repair 
or mood maintenance.  On the other hand, heuristic processing refers to judgments based 
on quick processing with little reference to the environment or judgment inferred from 
prevailing affect state.  This type of processing is most likely to occur when the situation 
is simple or highly typical and does not demand high accuracy or detailed consideration, 
and the individual has limited cognitive capacity.  In contrast, substantive processing is a 
generative strategy to compute outcome by selecting and interpreting novel information 
about the environment and to relate information to preexisting knowledge.  This occurs 
when the individual has cognitive capacity and is motivated to be accurate because of 
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implicit or explicit situational demands, and the situation is complex or atypical.  This 
model highlights the fact that processing consequences of mood can be indirect and are 
context dependent. 
 
Mood Effects on Executive Functioning 
Given the strong evidence and research support for Miyake and colleagues’ 
(2000) three latent variables of executive functioning abilities, the literature on the effect 
of mood on executive functions will be reviewed based on the areas of updating, 
inhibition and shifting.   
Updating 
 Updating requires actively manipulating relevant information in working memory; 
it involves monitoring and coding information relevant to the task at hand and then 
appropriately updating the items held in working memory by replacing old and no longer 
relevant information with new more relevant information (Miyake et al., 2000).  Updating 
has been found to be associated with activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
inferior frontal cortex, and anterior cingulate (Collette et al., 2006).  Updating is often 
investigated through paradigms in which one must select among a set of representations 
that are simultaneously active and choose the one representation that is most relevant to 
the task goal (Banich et al., 2009).  A task often used to measure updating is the N-back 
test, in which items (usually numbers or letters) are presented sequentially and 
participants have to decide whether a given item is the same as the one presented n items 
previously.  
 Studies have found that induction of an approach state (positive mood) using films 
showed improved verbal N-back test performance and declined spatial or visual N-back 
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test performance compared to neutral mood whereas induction of a withdrawal state 
(negative mood) showed improved spatial or visual N-back test performance and declined 
verbal N-back test performance compared to a neutral mood (Gray, 2001; Gray, Braver, 
& Raichle, 2002).  Similarly, participants induced into a negative mood, disgust through 
olfactory stimulation, showed reduced verbal N-back test performance compared to a 
neutral mood (Koch et al., 2007).  The participants in this study also rated their arousal 
levels as higher when they were in a negative mood than a neutral mood.  Therefore, the 
performance decline may have also been associated with higher arousal.  
 On the other hand, some studies have not found the interaction between mood 
valence and task modality.  Kliegel and colleagues (2005) found no difference in 
performance on a verbal N-back test between negative and neutral moods induced by 
films and music.  But the authors only examined error rates and did not measure reaction 
times, which may be more sensitive to detect differences. Another study examined 
negative mood on updating by applying physical shocks or threat of shocks (Shackman et 
al., 2006) during performance on verbal and spatial N-back tests.  Participants in the 
negative mood group had reduced accuracy on the spatial but not on the verbal N-back 
test compared to participants who received no shocks or threat of shocks.  Physiological 
measures of anxiety such as EMG activity in brow muscles and acoustic startle reflex 
mediated the reduction in spatial task performance.  A crucial difference in this study 
compared to other studies is that mood induced by the threat of shock or receiving shock 
is much higher in arousal than other studies using films or music.  Given that the impact 
of anxiety and arousal on performance follows an inverted U pattern (Yerkes & Dodson, 
1908), the arousal level in previous studies may have enhanced spatial updating but the 
higher arousal from the shocks negatively impacted spatial updating performance in this 
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study.  
 The available research findings do not support capacity limitation theories because 
there are tasks that are improved by positive and negative mood compared to neutral 
mood.  The processing style theories would suggest that the heuristic processing of 
positive mood would impair updating capacity, but studies found that positive mood 
improved updating on certain tasks.  In addition, the systematic processing of negative 
mood based on processing style theories would improve updating performance, but this 
was not always the case. Evidence for mood as a facilitator theory for updating is unclear 
because studies did not measure task enjoyment or task importance. However, positive 
mood improving performance on one task and reducing performance on another when the 
tasks are similar in nature does not suggest enjoyment or importance could account for 
the results.  Therefore, none of the current psychological theories account for research on 
updating and mood. 
 Updating performance differences as a function of mood and task modality may be 
explained by research in neuroimaging.  As previously mentioned, greater left prefrontal 
activity is related to positive mood and greater right prefrontal activity is related to 
negative mood (Davidson, 1992).  Complex working memory tasks for verbal 
information generally depend more on left prefrontal cortex and spatial information 
depend more on right prefrontal cortex (Smith & Jonides, 1999).  There is evidence 
suggesting that regionally specific, lateralized activation of brain regions relevant to a 
task is associated with better performance (Davidson, Chapman, Chapman, & Henriques, 
1990; Gur et al., 2000; Gur, Ragland, Resnick, & Skolnick, 1994; Papousek & Schulter, 
2004; Wendt & Risberg, 1994), meaning that activation of the right hemisphere as a result 
of negative mood produced better performance on tasks that also use the right 
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hemisphere.  The greater the magnitude of task appropriate hemisphere activation relative 
to the other hemisphere, the greater the task performance.  For example, individuals 
induced into a negative mood performed better on tasks involving visual targets presented 
in the left visual field than in the right visual field (Simon-Thomas, Role & Knight, 2005; 
Van Strien & Morpurgo 1992).  Studies found that individuals who were induced into a 
positive or approach mood showed a better performance in verbal fluency than 
individuals induced in a negative mood whereas those induced in a negative or 
withdrawal mood had better figural fluency than those in a positive mood (Bartolic, 
Basso, Schefft, Glauser, & Titanic-Schefft, 1999; Papousek, Schulter, & Lang, 2009).  In 
line with this reasoning, the effect of mood on updating appears to depend on the nature 
of the task; positive mood was associated with reduced performance on visually oriented 
tasks but improved performance on verbally oriented tasks and the negative mood showed 
the opposite pattern.  This relationship between updating and mood occurs when there is a 
moderate level of mood arousal because high mood arousal reduces working memory 
performance regardless of the task.  
Inhibition 
Inhibition can be described as preventing the production of predominant but 
inadequate responses or suppressing information when it becomes irrelevant (Friedman & 
Miyake, 2004).  It involves the ability to resist or resolve interference from distracting 
information in the external environment that is irrelevant to the task at hand, and the 
ability to inhibit memory intrusions from information that was previously relevant to the 
task but has since become irrelevant (Miyake et al., 2000).  Inhibition has been associated 
with multiple areas of the brain including the cingulate, prefrontal, parietal, and temporal 
areas (Collette et al., 2006).  A widely used task measuring inhibition is the Stroop task. 
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In this task, people are asked to name the colour of ink in which a coloured word is 
printed and to suppress the tendency to read the colour word (e.g. say red for the word 
‘blue’ printed in red ink).  Longer colour-ink reading times indicate difficulty inhibiting 
the habitual dominant response of reading.  Other measures of inhibition include the 
Go/no-go task and Flanker task.  In the Go/no-go task, participants are asked to respond 
to all stimuli except for one, which is shown infrequently; again participants must inhibit 
automatic responding.  In the Flanker task, the target items that participants must respond 
to are surrounded by distracting symbols that must be ignored, some which are 
compatible with the target and some are incompatible with the target. Reaction time is 
typically slower for targets flanked by incompatible compared to compatible stimuli, 
which is referred to as ‘flanker interference.’ 
 Several studies have examined the effect of positive mood on inhibition.  Stafford, 
Ng, Moore, and Bard (2010) compared Stroop performance between positive and neutral 
mood induced by music and found no difference in interference times or error rates 
between groups.  Likewise, Martin and Kerns (2011) found no difference in performance 
on the Stroop task or Flanker task between positive and neutral mood groups induced by 
film.  A study conducted by Phillips and colleagues (2002) using memory recall to induce 
mood found that participants induced to have a positive mood took longer on the Stroop 
task than when they were in a neutral mood; but this trend only approached significance.  
These studies suggest that positive mood does not affect inhibition. 
 Other studies have examined performance on inhibitory measures following 
negative mood induction.  Chepenik, Cornew, and Farah (2007) compared negative and 
neutral mood induced by music and imagery in the same participants and found no 
difference in their performance on the Stroop task or the Go/no-go task.  Finkelmeyer et 
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al. (2010) induced negative and neutral mood using odours and found that participants 
who rated the odours as high in arousal and negative in valence showed better 
performance on the Stroop.  Given that negative valence was also rated high in arousal 
compared to the neutral mood, it may be that high arousal was responsible for creating the 
performance boost.  Another confound in this study is that participants only rated the 
valence and arousal of odours and not their moods.  Melcher, Obst, Mann, Paulus and 
Gruber (2012) examined inhibition between negative and neutral mood using Stroop and 
Flanker tasks.  Moods were induced using sad and neutral faces shown before task trials.  
Participants were better at inhibiting their responses on both tasks after shown sad than 
neutral faces, suggesting that negative mood may be associated with improved inhibition.   
In contrast, individuals induced in a negative mood using autobiographical sad scripts 
made more errors in the incongruent trials than congruent trial on the Stroop task than 
baseline neutral measurement, indicating greater difficulty inhibition dominant 
responding (Nixon, Liddle, Nixon, & Liotti, 2013).  These studies show contradictory and 
inconclusive results on negative mood and inhibition. 
 Studies that examined both positive and negative moods have also found 
conflicting results.  For example, Kuhl and Kazen (1999) found that showing positive 
emotional words before a Stroop trial reduced the interference effect in the Stroop task.  
There was no difference in Stroop interference performance between participants in the 
negative and neutral group.  On the other hand, Braun-LaTour, Puccinelli, and Mast 
(2007) induced mood using film clips and found that individuals who watched a negative 
film clip showed a slower reaction time when performing the Stroop.  There was no 
difference in Stroop performance between those who watched positive and neutral film 
clips.  A major limitation of these two studies is that the authors did not check whether 
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there were actual changes in participants’ mood after the mood induction.  Chu and 
Abeare (2011) found no difference in Stroop interference times or anti-saccade accuracy 
levels between neutral, positive and negative-induced mood groups. They found a trend 
indicating that the negative mood group had the highest reaction time difference 
suggesting that the negative group had greater difficulty inhibiting their eye movements 
in comparison to the neutral and positive mood groups as revealed by the greater response 
time.  Brand, Verspui, and Oving (1997) also compared self-reported changes in negative, 
positive, and neutral mood on the Stroop interference task.  Although there was no 
difference between groups in overall reaction time, the negative mood group showed 
greater reaction times when making errors than the positive mood group.  Smallwood, 
Fitzgerald, Miles, and Phillips (2009) induced mood using film clips and then assessed 
several performance factors on a variant of the Go/no-go task, in which participants must 
inhibit a response to an infrequent target, called the sustained attention to response task.  
Results indicated that negative mood was associated with greater errors and less 
behaviour adjustment following lapses, meaning greater attention lapses than positive 
mood.  Interestingly, there was no performance difference between positive and neutral 
mood.  Consistent with this finding, another study using sounds to induce mood during 
performance on the Go/no-go task found that the response times were longer for 
participants in a negative mood compared to positive or neutral moods (Yu, Yuan, & Luo, 
2009).  
Similarly, participants induced in a high arousal, negative mood such as anxiety 
showed lower accuracy rates when performing the Flanker task compared to no mood 
induction (Larson, Gray, Clayson, Jones, & Kirwan, 2013).  Mood was induced using 
music and memory for previous mood-congruent events.  Low arousal, negative mood 
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(e.g., sad) and high and low arousal positive mood (e.g., calm and happy) did not show 
any performance difference from no mood induction.  Rowe and colleagues (2007) 
examined performance on the Flanker task between individuals induced in a negative, 
positive, and neutral mood with music.  Participants in a positive mood showed greater 
flanker interference compared to when they were induced in a neutral or sad mood.  There 
was no performance difference between sad and neutral mood.  In addition to inhibition, 
the Flanker task requires selective attention to attend to central target and ignore 
distractors.  Broadened attention scope can reduce performance on this task; therefore, 
Rowe and colleagues (2007) investigated the role of attention by manipulating the 
processing difficulty through perceptual crowding and comparing near versus far 
flankers.  The spacing of flankers affected performance in positive mood; far 
incompatible flankers demonstrated greater interference relative to compatible flankers. 
This suggested that increased attention scope may account for the performance difference 
on the flanker task for individuals in a positive mood. 
Overall, the current literature showed conflicting results on the effect of mood on 
inhibition.  However, examining only studies in which mood manipulation checks were 
conducted and there were no apparent confounding factors, negative mood was often 
associated with decreased inhibitory control whereas positive mood did not affect 
inhibitory control.  The one study that found positive mood associated with increased 
reaction time on an inhibitory task (Rowe et al., 2007) may have reflected greater 
attention scope rather than inhibitory control.  The collective results of these studies do 
not provide evidence for the mood as a facilitator theory because positive mood was not 
associated with greater inhibitory control and instead showed similar performance to 
those in a neutral mood.  It is possible that the positive mood induced in studies was not 
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strong enough to show performance differences, as it is difficult to induce positive mood 
at a moderate arousal level.  The lack of measurement for task interest or motivation in 
these studies does not allow us to adequately evaluate the mood as facilitator theory.  The 
processing style theories would suggest that the distractibility and heuristic processing 
style of positive mood leads to reduced inhibitory control whereas the systematic 
processing style of negative mood improves inhibition, but this contradicts the results of 
most studies.  There is some support for capacity limitation theories as negative mood 
was associated with reduced cognitive performance; however, this was not consistently 
found.  In addition, the majority of studies found no difference in performance between 
positive and neutral moods, contradictory to theory predictions.  In summary, none of the 
current theories fit the results of studies examining mood effect on inhibition. 
Shifting  
 Shifting is defined as efficient reactions to environmental stimuli that require rapid 
and frequent shifts between different aspects of a stimulus or between different cognitive 
operations (Collette et al., 2006).  This is also often referred to in the literature as 
switching, and therefore will be used interchangeably with switching in this paper.  
Shifting process involves the disengagement of an irrelevant task set and the subsequent 
active engagement of a relevant task set (Miyake et al., 2000).  Shifting has shown to be 
related to activation in the prefrontal, parietal, and subcortical areas (Collette et al., 2006; 
Dove, Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon, 2000; Yeung, Nystrom, Aronson, & 
Cohen, 2006).  In shifting tasks, participants perform two or more different tasks within a 
series of trials, and performance on trials that involve switching between tasks is 
compared to that for trials without a switch.  Participants showed longer response 
latencies when they had to perform a switched task than a repeated task; this is known as 
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the switch cost (Collette et al., 2006).  Cues given beforehand (before the trial begins) 
about which task to complete and practice switching between specific tasks were found to 
reduce but not eliminate switch costs (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Meiran, 1996). 
Switch costs that are present even when individuals are given time to prepare for the 
switch is known as residual switch cost (Cepeda, Kramer, & Gonzalaez de Sather, 2001).  
The evidence for residual switch cost suggests that the increased reaction time when 
individuals switch between tasks is robust.  Switch costs occur with forced switching, in 
which a cue is provided asking participants to switch (Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000), and 
voluntary switching, in which participants are told to switch between two tasks on their 
own while performing each task equally often and in a random sequence (Arrington & 
Logan, 2004; 2005).  Switch cost has been distinguished between global or general effect 
and specific or local effect (Hahn, Andersen, & Kramer, 2004; Madden et al., 2010).  The 
global switch cost represents the additional demands of switching while completing a 
dual task compared to a single task, as measured by the difference in reaction time for 
repeated trials in dual-task blocks (i.e., AABA from single-task blocks i.e., AAAA).  The 
specific switch cost represents the switch in task trials across individual trials and is 
measured by the difference in reaction time for switch trials i.e., AABA compared to 
repeated trials within a dual-task block i.e., AABA.  Both types of switch costs have been 
found in the literature (Arrington & Logan, 2004). 
Phillips, Bull and colleagues (2002) examined the effects of positive mood 
induced by reading emotional stories in two different switching tasks: alternating verbal 
fluency and alternating Stroop.  On the alternating fluency task, individuals were asked to 
switch between category and lexical fluency.  The neutral group performed better on the 
alternating verbal fluency than the positive group.  The neutral group was also quicker at 
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the alternating Stroop task in which participants had to switch between naming the colour 
of the ink and reading the coloured word.  Phillips, Bull and colleagues (2002) suggested 
that alternating verbal fluency and Stroop tasks used forced switching rather than the 
spontaneous switching that is frequently measured in creative tasks.  In forced switching, 
there is a need for effortful suppression of a previously active task set and then activation 
of a previously suppressed task set.  Alternatively, Braun-Latour and colleagues (2007) 
found that participants in a negative mood were slower at switching between randomly 
congruent and incongruent stimuli in the altering Stroop task whereas participants in a 
positive mood performed similar to participants in the neutral mood.  In this study, mood 
was induced using film clips but there was no measure of mood after induction to ensure 
actual mood changes.  Stafford and colleagues (2010) also compared Stroop alternating 
performance between positive and neutral mood induced by music and found no 
difference in reaction time or error rates between groups.  Unlike Phillips and colleagues’ 
study, they examined performance on two other tasks.  Although the tasks were 
counterbalanced for order, mood changes may have dissipated due to the length of time 
between mood induction and task performance. 
Zhou and colleagues (2011) examined the effect of negative mood on a switching 
task in which participants determined whether a digit was odd/even or high/low. Faces 
were used as cues for which task to perform; male faces indicated that participants should 
do one task whereas female faces indicated participants should do the other task.  These 
faces were also manipulated to induce mood (fearful vs. neutral faces). Zhou found that 
switch cost was larger in trials containing the fearful face cues than the neutral face cues.  
Again, the lack of mood measurement and possible arousal difference between fearful 
and neutral faces make it uncertain whether the effects are specific to negative mood.   
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Chu and Abeare (2011) examined mood effects on shifting sets using the Stroop 
alternating and written fluency tasks in young adults.  The Stroop alternating task 
required participants to switch between naming colour ink and reading colour words.  
Alternation cost compared the reaction time on the alternating task to the two control 
tasks of colour naming and reading words; therefore greater alternation costs indicate 
greater difficulty switching.  Compared to the practice trials, participants in the neutral 
and negative mood groups showed a lower switch cost after the mood induction; thus they 
became better at switching.  Participants in the positive mood group were slower on the 
Stroop alternating trial after the mood induction.  There were no group differences on the 
written fluency-alternating task.  The results suggest that compared to neutral mood, 
negative mood may improve switching in a rigidly structured task whereas positive mood 
may decline switching on such a task.  When there is greater flexibility allowed in a task 
such as on the written fluency-alternating task, no mood effects were demonstrated. 
 Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) found that positive mood induction using pictures 
was associated with faster performance when participants had to switch to responding to 
stimuli of a new colour while distractors appeared in a formerly relevant colour 
(perseveration condition).  Alternatively, positive mood was associated with slower 
switching performance when participants had to respond to a previously task irrelevant 
stimuli and ignore novel distracters (learned irrelevance condition).  This increased switch 
cost during positive mood may reflect greater interference from novel distractors due to 
broadening of the attention scope.  But the positive pictures chosen were higher in arousal 
than neutral pictures, so the authors conducted a second experiment using negative 
valence pictures with similar arousal ratings as the positive pictures.  They found that 
individuals who saw the negative pictures performed similarly to the neutral group 
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(Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004).  In this study, mood again was not checked following the 
manipulation.  
In summary, the literature suggests that the effect on mood appears to depend on 
the type of set-switching task.  Positive mood as compared to neutral mood was 
associated with greater switch costs when the task involves forced switching or switching 
to previously task irrelevant stimuli while ignoring novel distractors.  On the other hand, 
positive mood was associated with improved switching abilities when the task required 
responding to new stimuli and ignoring previously relevant distractors.  Studies 
examining the role of negative mood in set-switching found conflicting results (Braun-
Latour et al., 2007; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004); however, most of the studies did not 
measure mood after induction so it is unclear whether the negative mood induction 
worked.  Chu and Abeare’s (2011) study which reported negative mood following mood 
induction found that negative mood was associated with lower switch cost in Stroop 
alternating task compared to neutral mood but no difference in switching on an 
alternating written fluency task. 
 The current literature related to positive mood and set-switching are most 
consistent with the processing style theories (Bolte et al., 2003; Fiedler, 2001; 
Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Schwarz & Bless, 1991).  The increased flexibility of 
positive mood would improve the performance on tasks that require responding to new 
stimuli but the increased distractibility would impede performance on tasks that show 
distractors in a new colour and on tasks that require a forced switching response.  This 
body of research does not support the capacity limitation theory because contrary to 
predictions made by this theory, positive mood was associated with better performance on 
certain switching tasks when compared to neutral mood (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004).  
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The mood as facilitator theory would predict that positive mood would be associated with 
greater switching abilities than neutral mood, but studies did not consistently find this.  It 
can be argued that poor performance of positive mood on some switching tasks may have 
been a reflection of poor interest or motivation from participants, however, the lack of 
control for these variables make it difficult for us to fully discount this theory.  There is 
neurological evidence supporting these findings.  Phasic dopamine increases in the 
prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate as a result of positive mood serve as a gating 
signal that updates working memory and facilitates switch of cognitive set (Braver, 
Barch, & Cohen, 1999, Miller & Cohen, 2001; O’Reilly, 2006).  Cohen and colleagues 
(2002) suggests that phasic bursts of dopamine convey important reward-related 
information; these neurons show rapid, stimulus-specific response to salient stimuli in the 
environment.  Phasic bursts of dopamine activity signal which information should be 
selected and stored in the prefrontal cortex and thereby protected from intervening 
distractors, until a behavioural response occurs.  Motor activation from responding 
suppresses the dopamine system to return to baseline levels until the next working 
memory update.  Dreisbach et al. (2005) investigated the role of dopamine activity in 
executive functioning using spontaneous eye blink rate.  Spontaneous eye blink is a 
functional marker of central dopaminergic functioning, it is increased in primates with 
dopamine agonists and reduced in patients with Parkinson’s disease.  Therefore, eye 
blinking is directly correlated with reduced dopamine activity in subcortical areas.  
Dreisbach et al. (2005) found that those with high eye blinking demonstrated impaired 
performance in the learned irrelevance condition and better performance in the 
perseveration condition, similar to performance of individuals induced in a positive 
mood.  Muller et al. (2007) also found that high eye blink rate predicted better switching 
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cost in preservation condition and reduced switching cost in the learned relevance 
condition.  These findings suggest that dopamine activity associated with positive mood 
enhances cognitive flexibility but also increases distractibility.  
Interpretation of Mood Effects on Executive Function 
 A review of the current literature suggests that the relationship between mood and 
cognition is not a simple one.  None of the present theoretical models adequately explain 
all the results.  The capacity limitation theories suggest that mood changes reduce 
cognitive processing capacity as a result of resources being used up for emotion related 
thoughts (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988).  This hypothesis was not supported across any 
examined domains of executive function.  Positive and negative moods were rarely 
associated with significantly reduced performance as compared to neutral mood.  On the 
contrary, evidence suggests that positive and negative moods improve performance on 
certain cognitive tasks.  The mood as a facilitator theory suggests that positive mood is 
associated with improved cognitive performance when there are adequate levels of 
motivation and task enjoyment (Ashby, Isen & Turken, 1999).  Although positive mood 
was not consistently associated with increased cognitive performance, none of the studies 
measured motivation or task enjoyment levels.  Therefore, the current studies cannot 
provide evidence to fully discount the mood as a facilitator theory. 
 Studies on set-switching abilities seem to provide some evidence for the processing 
style model.  These models suggest that positive mood is associated with heuristic 
processing and reliance on general knowledge whereas negative mood is associated with 
systematic processing and detailed analysis of the external environment (Fiedler, 1988, 
2001; Schwarz & Bless, 1991).  Studies demonstrate that positive mood is associated with 
slower reaction time on forced switching tasks as hypothesized by the processing style 
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theories.  On the other hand, predictions based on the processing style of negative mood 
were not supported because there were conflicting results for effects of negative mood on 
all aspects of executive functioning; some studies found facilitation and other studies 
found suppression.  Furthermore, there was greater evidence for reduced inhibitory 
control when individuals are induced in a negative mood, which would be contrary to 
predictions of the processing style models. 
 Research on mood and working memory suggests that hemispheric processing 
differences may play a factor in the relationship between mood and executive functions.  
Past research has found greater left prefrontal activation for positive mood and greater 
right prefrontal activation for negative mood, and that regionally specific, lateralized 
activation of brain regions relevant to a task is associated with better performance (Gur et 
al., 2000; Papousek & Schulter, 2004; Wendt & Risberg, 1994).  There is evidence for a 
double dissociation for mood valence and different measures of working memory (Gray, 
2001; Gray, Braver, & Raichle, 2002), positive mood associated with left hemisphere 
activity was related to increased performance on verbal working memory whereas 
negative mood associated with right hemisphere activity showed increased performance 
on visual working memory tasks.  This suggests that the nature of the task may play a 
factor in the relationship between mood and executive function.  The lack of studies 
comparing visual and verbal tasks in inhibition and shifting makes it difficult to ascertain 
whether this finding extends to all aspects of executive functioning.  Future studies should 
examine if there are cognitive performance differences across stimuli type for measures 
of all executive functions following positive and negative mood induction.   
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Older Adults 
Aging Related Changes in Executive Function and Emotions 
The majority of the studies that examined mood effects on executive functioning 
used young adults as participants.  However, the relationship between mood and 
executive functioning may differ between older and younger adults because older adults 
show changes in executive functioning abilities compared to young adults.  Research 
indicates that various executive functioning abilities, such as inhibition, (Andrés & van 
der Linden, 2000; Klein, Ponds, Houx, & Jolles, 1997; Samanez-Larkin, Robertson, 
Mikels, Carstensen, & Gotlib, 2009; Treitz, Heyder, & Daum, 2007; Troyer, Leach, & 
Strauss, 2006; Wecker, Kramer, Wisniewski, Delis, & Kaplan, 2000), planning (Andrés 
& Van der Linden, 2000; Kliegel, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2000), set-switching (Cepeda et 
al., 2001; Keys & White, 2000; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Meiran, Gotler, & Perlman, 
2001; Robbins et al., 1998), and working memory (Bopp & Verhaeghen, 2005; Salthouse 
& Skovronek, 1992) have been shown to decline with age.  For example, Treitz and 
colleagues (2007) examined cognitive functioning among four consecutive age groups 
(20–30 years, 31–45 years, 46–60 years, and 61–75 years) in a large population study in 
which participants were matched on intelligence and mood.  They found that aging was 
associated with deficits in inhibition and divided attention and these changes in executive 
functions started occurring between 60 and 70 years of age (Mathersul et al., 2008; Treitz 
et al., 2007). 
 Researchers have attempted to determine the underlining reason for age-related 
cognitive decline.  While some researchers suggested that slower processing speed 
accounted for age-associated cognitive decline (Adrover-Roig et al., 2012; Baune, 
Suslow, Engelien, Arolt, & Berger, 2006; Salthouse, 1995; Uttl & Graf, 1997; 
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Verhaeghen & De Meersman, 1998;), other studies indicated that processing speed does 
not completely account for reduced cognitive abilities in older adults (Andres & Van der 
Linden, 2000; Bucur et al., 2008; Cepeda et al., 2001; Keys & White, 2000; Robbins et 
al., 1998; Salthouse & Ferrer-Caja, 2003; Verhaeghen, Steitz, Sliwinski, & Cerella, 
2003).  Another factor that may explain the age-related decline in executive function is 
processing style.  In order to conserve their limited resources, it has been suggested that 
older persons rely more on heuristic processes (Yates & Patalano, 1999).  Older adults 
were more likely than young adults to adopt heuristic strategies rather than systematic-
processing strategies unless given environmental support (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000; 
Mutter & Poliske, 1994; Wang & Chen, 2004); this heuristic strategy may undermine 
performance on executive functioning tasks that often require systematic processing.  
Working memory has also been suggested to explain age-related cognitive decline in 
older adults (McCabe, Roediger, McDaniel, Balota, & Hambrick, 2010; Park et al., 1996; 
Park et al., 2002).  Goffaux, Phillips, Sinai, and Pushkar (2008) examined task-switching 
components between younger and older adults categorized by high or low working 
memory capabilities.  Younger and older participants with high working memory 
capacities had similar reaction times and performed better than older participants with 
low working memory capacities, suggesting that working memory capacity abilities may 
help older adults with their set-switching abilities.  Kramer, Hahn and Gopher (1999) also 
found that older adults showed reduced switching cost with practice under low memory 
load (where they were given cues indicating when to switch) but not under high memory 
load (where they had to remember to switch after a certain number of trials).  This 
suggests that working memory may be a factor that influences shifting performance in 
older adults. 
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Atrophy of neurons in the frontal network has also been proposed as the reason for 
cognitive decline (Dempster, 1992; West, 1996), including executive functioning, 
associated with old age.  Although many brain areas show neurological decline with 
normal aging (Brickman et al., 2007; Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004), neuroimaging studies 
indicated that the volume and activation of frontal lobes decreased with age more so than 
other brain areas (Azari, Rapoport, Salerno, & Grady, 1992; Grieve, Clark, Williams, 
Peduto, & Gordon, 2005; Raz, Gunning-Dixon, Head, Dupuis, & Acker, 1998; Resnick, 
Pham, Kraut, Zonderman, & Davatzikos, 2003; Tisserand & Jolles, 2003; Van Petten et 
al., 2004).  Studies found that volume loss in the prefrontal cortex and white matter 
hyperintensities were associated with reduced executive function in older adults 
(Gunning-Dixon & Raz, 2003; Raz et al., 1998).  Furthermore, cognitive changes 
observed in normal aging have been linked to the decline in function of the dopamine 
system projection to the prefrontal cortex (Bäckman, Nyberg, Lindenberger, Li, & Farde, 
2006; Braver & Barch, 2002).  
One area of executive functioning that does not show a decline with aging is 
emotional regulation.  Early studies found that the intensity and frequency of self reported 
emotion declined with age (Diener, Sandvik, & Larsen, 1985; Lawton, Kleban, 
Rajagopal, & Dean 1992).  This age decline did not appear to be associated with reduced 
reactivity to emotion provoking stimuli because multiple studies found no age differences 
in self reported reactivity to mood induction procedures (Labouvie-Vief, Lumley, Jain, & 
Heinze, 2003; Levenson, Carstensen, Friesen, & Ekman, 1991; Reminger, Kaszniak, & 
Dalby, 2000; Tsai, Levenson, & Carstensen, 2000).  Although older adults did not report 
differences in emotional reactivity, it is unclear whether they respond physiologically 
different from younger adults.  Some studies found that older adults show less 
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physiological arousal to emotion provoking stimuli (Labouvie-Vief et al., 2003; Levenson 
et al., 1991; Tsai, Levenson, & Carstensen, 2001) while other studies found no difference 
in emotional physiology between older and younger adults (Kunzmann & Grühn, 2005; 
Kunzmann, Kupperbusch, & Levenson, 2005; Reminger et al., 2000). 
Further examination of emotional experiences in older adults suggested reduced 
negative emotional experiences (Birditt & Fingerman, 2003; Carstensen, Pasupathi, 
Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Gross et al., 1997).  Carstensen and colleagues (2000) asked 
participants to record their emotions when they were paged at random times throughout 
the day for a week.  Participants indicated which emotions they were experiencing and 
how intensely they felt them.  The study found that positive emotions were maintained in 
both frequency and intensity across adulthood whereas negative emotions declined in 
frequency.  Older people also rated negative pictures as less emotionally arousing than 
younger adults whereas they experienced comparable emotional arousal to positive 
pictures (Mather et al., 2004).  Similarly, Gross and colleagues (1997) using an 
ethnically- and culturally-diverse sample found that age was associated with decreased 
negative emotional experiences such as anger, sadness, and fear and increased 
experiences of happiness.  They also found that age was associated with increased 
emotional control, particularly internal control.  Gross and colleagues suggested that as 
we age, we have increasingly effective emotional control and therefore, selectively 
enhance positive emotion and dampen negative emotions.  Evidence for this selective 
dampening of negative emotions was found in emotional memory studies where older 
adults were less likely to recall and recognize negative images compared to positive or 
neutral images than younger adults (Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003; Mather & 
Carstensen, 2003), and engaged in more elaborative processing when retrieving positive 
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memories than when retrieving negative memories (Mather & Knight, 2005).  Although 
many studies find a decrease in negative emotional experience among older adults, not all 
studies do (Kliegel, Jäger, & Phillips, 2007; Pearman, Andreoletti, & Isaacowitz, 2010; 
Reminger et al., 2000).  
Direct support for the theory that older adults show greater emotional control is 
that older adults themselves reported having greater emotional control compared to 
younger and middle aged participants (Lawton et al., 1992; McConatha, Leone, & 
Armstrong, 1997; Phillips, Henry, Hosie, & Milne, 2008).  Older adults were more 
effective at mood repair after a negative mood induction than younger adults (Kliegel et 
al., 2007; Pearman et al., 2010).  They were also more effective than young adults at 
solving everyday problems, in particular for interpersonal problems (Blanchard-Fields, 
Mienaltowski, & Seay, 2007) and showed higher scores than young adults on three of 
four branches of an emotional intelligence test (Kafetsios, 2004).  A recent study by 
Scheibe and Blanchard-Fields (2009) examined people’s regulation of emotions while 
they performed a working memory task.  Disgust was induced using a film clip and 
different instructions were given regarding emotion regulation.  When instructed to down-
regulate disgust feelings, young adults’ working memory performance was reduced after 
the mood induction whereas working memory performance was unaffected in older 
adults.  These results suggest that older adults are better able to regulate their emotions so 
that it does not interfere with cognitive processing.  Different theories have been proposed 
to explain the increased emotional control associated with aging (for review of theories, 
see Scheibe & Carstensen, 2010), including age is associated with greater motivation for 
emotional control because of life goals from perception of time (Carstensen, Issacowitz, 
& Charles, 1999), diminishing cognitive capacities that makes it difficult to process 
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negative emotion and therefore older adults minimize negative feelings (Labouvie-Vief, 
2003), and differential use of emotional regulation strategies including proactive 
instrumental strategies due to life experiences which makes older adults more competent 
in emotional control (Blanchard-Fields, 2007). 
Mood Effects on Executive Functioning in Older Adults 
The present literature suggests that older adults have reduced executive 
functioning in many areas but show improved emotional regulation along with decreased 
negative emotion processing (Carstensen et al., 2000; Gross et al., 1997; Kliegel et al., 
2007; Phillips et al., 2008).  Additionally, neuroimaging studies demonstrated that 
deterioration of the frontal lobe is associated with aging (Grieve et al., 2005; Raz et al., 
1998; Resnick et al., 2003).  Theories on the effects of mood on cognition have been built 
on research using young participants, therefore, it is uncertain how the various theories 
will account for age-related changes in older adults.  One possibility is the effects of 
frontal lobe deterioration in aging may be exacerbated by the presence of positive or 
negative mood states when performing cognitive tasks.  Older adults may perform even 
worse on measures of executive functioning when induced into positive or negative mood 
because of increased emotional processing load compared to being in a neutral mood or 
compared to young adults induced in similar moods.  On the other hand, older adults were 
found to be better able to regulate their emotions, especially negative ones, and therefore, 
may show less mood effects on executive functioning.  Thus, they may react similarly to 
a neutral mood when induced in a positive or negative mood, especially when in a 
negative mood because this has been found to be reduced in older adults.  
Only a couple of studies have examined the effect of mood on executive 
functioning in older adults.  Baune and colleagues (2006) investigated the effect of 
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depressed mood on the performance of neuropsychological tests using a population-based 
cross sectional study for participants aged 65 to 83 years.  Depressed mood was measured 
using a self-report scale called the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale 
(Radloff, 1977).  Neuropsychological measures used in the study assessed episodic 
memory, word fluency, inhibition, processing speed and motor function.  Although 
multivariate linear regression analyses revealed a significant effect of depressive 
symptoms on processing speed and motor functioning, depressed mood was not 
associated with performance on the Stroop interference task.  This study examined 
depressive symptoms, which includes many other symptoms in addition to sad mood.  
Therefore, it is uncertain whether these findings will translate to normal, negative mood 
changes.  Phillips, Smith and Gilhooly (2002) induced positive, negative and neutral 
moods using films and music in older and younger adults before measuring their 
performance on a planning task (the Tower of London; TOL).  They found that older 
adults in a positive or negative mood state performed poorly compared to young adults on 
the Tower of London task.  Even though young adults induced into a happy mood also 
showed lowered performance on the TOL, the performance reduction was greater among 
older participants induced in a happy mood.  In contrast, there was no difference in 
performance between young adults who were in a negative mood and a neutral mood, 
however, older adults in a negative mood were more likely to make excess moves than 
older adults in a neutral mood.  Despite that the negative mood manipulation in this study 
produced a significant reduction in mood ratings, most of the participants still rated their 
mood as more positive than negative.  In addition, older adults generally rated their mood 
as more positive than young adults and showed an increase in reported mood between 
post mood induction and after task completion (irrespective of mood induction condition) 
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whereas young adults did not.  Phillips, Smith and colleagues (2002) suggested that older 
adults were engaging in some form of mood improvement while they performed the task 
and proposed that lower working memory capacity in older adults made it harder for them 
to deal with an extra load imposed by positive or negative mood induction.  Mood 
induction may operate something like a dual-task load, occupying processing capacity.  A 
limitation of Phillips, Smith et al. (2002) study is that the performance difference between 
older and younger adults may be partially related to increased general positive mood 
because older adults rated their mood as more positive across all time points in the study 
and positive mood has been found to reduce planning abilities (Oaksford et al., 1996).  
In summary, there has only been one study (Phillips, Smith et al., 2002) that 
examined executive functioning in older adults following mood inductions.  Findings 
from this study suggested that older adults showed lowered performance on a planning 
task after mood induction, regardless of valence, compared to neutral mood.  
Additionally, older adults showed worse performance than younger adults following 
positive and negative mood induction.  These results are consistent with the capacity 
limitation theories that hypothesize that positive and negative moods is associated with 
reduced performance compared to neutral moods. 
 
Chapter II 
Study 
This present study aims to fill the gap in the literature by examining the effect of 
mood on shifting abilities in young and older adults.  It is important to examine our 
shifting abilities because of their applicability to everyday function.  We switch from 
doing different tasks in our daily lives.  Previous studies often examined positive and 
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON SET-SWITCHING   
 
53 
negative moods without a neutral group or compared a neutral group with either a 
positive or negative group.  It is important to compare performance between positive, 
negative, and neutral mood; otherwise it is difficult to ascertain whether changes are due 
to specifically mood valence or arousal levels or both.  This present study compares 
induced positive and negative moods to a neutral mood. This research study examines the 
role mood changes have on young and older adults’ shifting performance using a forced 
cued based switching task.   
The literature on shifting processes has distinguished between global and specific 
switch costs.  Global switch cost, which is the comparison between reaction times from 
repeated trials in dual task blocks and repeated trials in single task blocks, is confounded 
by different working memory demands because there is a greater working memory 
demand in dual task blocks compared to single task blocks (Kray & Lindenberger, 2000). 
In dual task blocks, it is necessary to maintain task instructions for different tasks in 
working memory.  Given that older adults show declined working memory, this study 
examined specific or local shift costs –the increase in reaction times from switch trials 
compared to repeated trials within dual task blocks to reduce the confound of working 
memory demands affecting performance in older adults.  In this study, switching 
performance was measured by switching cost and number of errors made.  Switching cost 
was measured by subtracting reaction time (RT) on non-switch trials (trials in which there 
was no switching involved, e.g., AAA) in switching conditions from RT on switch trials 
in switch conditions (trials in which participants asked to switch from one task to another, 
e.g., ABA).  Participant errors were distinguished between switch errors, which are 
failures to switch between tasks (e.g. indicating number of syllables when task was to 
determine shape) and decision errors, which are selecting the wrong response within a 
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correct task set (e.g. deciding an animal as inanimate).  Difficulty switching between two 
tasks is indicated by greater switch costs and/or more errors made.  
Research suggests that switching between different operations on a set of stimuli 
involves retrieval of a task set on each trial, disengaging from irrelevant task set, and 
actively engaging relevant task set  (Miyake et al., 2000).  Shifting has been suggested to 
involve overcoming proactive interference or negative priming due to having previously 
performed a different operation on the same type of stimuli (Wylie & Allport, 2000).  
Thus, the ability to inhibit plays a role in task shifting because it reduces interference 
from irrelevant dimensions of the task.  In this study, interference from irrelevant 
dimensions was examined by using repeated stimuli for a different task operation (e.g. see 
“cow” and asked to do Task A and then see “cow” again but asked to do Task B). 
Participants switched from stimuli repeated just recently (two trials ago) and from stimuli 
repeated a while ago (trials that occurred more than four trials ago).  Inhibition control 
was measured by subtracting reaction time for repeated stimuli that occurred two trials 
ago from reaction time for repeated stimuli that occurred more than four trials ago. 
Greater residual inhibition is associated with the more recently abandoned set compared 
to the less recently abandoned set (Mayr, 2001; Mayr & Kliegel, 2003).  Reduced 
inhibitory control was defined as greater reaction times on recently repeated trials than 
previously repeated trials in the switching conditions.  The number of errors made when 
responding to the repeated stimuli was also counted; greater number of errors also 
indicated reduced inhibitory control.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Young Adults.  The current literature on mood effects in shifting performance 
among young adults provides some evidence for the processing style theories.  Based on 
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the processing style theories, we expect young adults to show decreased shifting abilities 
when in a positive mood compared to a neutral mood when performing a forced set-
switching task due to increased distraction and use of heuristics.  In contrast, young adults 
would show increased shifting abilities when in a negative mood compared to a neutral 
mood because of greater focused attention and systematic analysis.  Given that inhibitory 
control plays a role in set shifting, we would expect that young adults would show 
reduced inhibitory control in a positive mood whereas improved inhibitory control in a 
negative mood compared to a neutral mood during the set shifting task. 
Older Adults.  Given the lack of studies examining mood effects on executive 
functioning in older adults, it is uncertain whether they will show similar performances to 
young adults.  A past study found that older adults performed more poorly on a planning 
task when induced in negative and positive moods than neutral mood (Phillips, Smith, et 
al., 2002); this finding is consistent with the capacity limitation theories.  Frontal regions 
of the brain deteriorate with aging, and frontal areas have been found to be involved in 
processing emotions and set-switching abilities.  Therefore, older adults may show 
reduced switching performance when induced in positive or negative mood because of an 
increased emotional processing load.  Research indicates that performing an executive 
functioning task undermined later efforts at engaging in emotion control, and engaging in 
emotional control reduced performance on an executive task among young adults 
(Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields, 2009).  This trend of emotional control undermining 
executive functions may be magnified in older adults who show brain deterioration in 
areas used to perform these tasks (Schmeichel, 2007).  In addition, the effects of positive 
mood might be magnified for older adults who tend to engage in more heuristic 
processing than young adults.  According to this line of reasoning, older adults would 
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show greater shift costs and make more errors when they are in a negative and positive 
mood compared to when they are in a neutral mood.  Older adults would also have greater 
shift costs, reduced inhibitory control and make more errors than young adults following 
positive and negative moods inductions.  
Alternatively, older adults were found to be better at regulating their emotions, 
especially negative emotions.  Therefore, their increased emotional regulation skill may 
result in less mood effects on executive functioning due to mood repair.  Scheibe and 
Blanchard-Fields (2009) showed that young adults’ working memory performance was 
reduced after the mood induction when instructed to down regulate negative feelings 
whereas older adults’ memory performance showed no performance difference between 
negative and neutral mood when asked to down regulate feelings, suggesting that older 
adults are better able to regulate their emotions so that it does not interfere with cognitive 
processing.  Thus, older adults when induced in a positive or negative mood may show no 
performance difference compared to a neutral mood, especially in a negative mood 
because older adults are more likely to repair negative moods.  That is, older adults will 
show no difference in their switch cost, inhibitory control or the number of errors made 
between negative, positive and neutral mood induction states.  
Older vs. Young Adults.  Past research has found a decline in set-switching 
abilities for older compared to young adults (Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Meiran, Gotler, 
& Perlman, 2001).  Older adults demonstrated reduced inhibitory control by taking longer 
to disengage from a previously performed task than young adults (Cepeda et al., 2001).  
As such, we would expect older adults to show decreased set-switching abilities (as 
measured by greater switching cost and/or more switching errors) and reduced inhibitory 
control (as measured by greater inhibition reaction time difference and/or more errors) 
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compared with young adults under a neutral mood.  
Theories.  This study also tests two proposed theories.  Previous studies have not 
adequately tested the mood as a facilitator theory.  This study examines hypotheses based 
on this theory by measuring participants’ interest and motivation levels.  The mood as a 
facilitator theory suggests that positive mood would be associated with better switching 
abilities compared to neutral mood if task interest level and motivation are high.  
However, if task interest and motivation are low, participants in a positive mood would 
show reduced switching abilities compared to neutral mood.  
Research from working memory tasks suggests that performance on cognitive 
tasks may differ by task modality.  Specifically, positive mood appeared to facilitate 
performance on verbal tasks but reduced performance on visual tasks.  Negative mood 
showed the opposite performance pattern.  There is evidence that regionally specific, 
lateralized activation of brain regions relevant to a task is associated with better 
performance (Gur et al., 1994, 2000; Wendt & Risberg, 1994).  This study investigates if 
this pattern holds true for tasks measuring shifting abilities by using two comparable 
switching tasks, one that requires verbal processing and the other that requires visual 
perceptual processing.  According to this lateralization pattern, the greater activation of 
the right hemisphere as a result of a negative mood induction should produce better 
performance on tasks that also use the right hemisphere (visual switching task) compared 
to a neutral mood.  On the other hand, greater activation of the left hemisphere from a 
positive mood induction should produce better performance on tasks that also use the left 
hemisphere (verbal switching task) compared to a neutral mood.  
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Methodology 
Participants 
Sixty young adults aged 18 to 25 were recruited from the University of Toronto, 
Scarborough campus through the psychology participant pool.  The study was posted 
online and students from the psychology pool signed up for the different appointment 
timeslots available.  Fifty-five older adults aged 65 and older were recruited from a 
research pool at Baycrest, a geriatric hospital in Toronto, Ontario, and from the 
community through advertisements posted at local community centers.  The Baycrest 
research pool provided the phone numbers of the older adults or older adults saw the 
research advertisement and contacted the author.  The author then contacted the older 
adults by phone to explain the study, to briefly screen for any history of chronic 
psychiatric illness, neurological disorder, learning disability and substance abuse and to 
set up the appointment.   
Participants who self reported a history of chronic psychiatric illness, neurological 
disorders (e.g. stroke, seizures, head injuries), learning disability and substance abuse 
were excluded (n = 8).  Potential alcohol abuse was briefly screened using the CAGE 
questionnaire (Mayfield, McLeod, & Hall, 1974); participants who answered yes to two 
of the four questions were excluded (n = 1).  Symptoms of anxiety and depression were 
screened using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 
1983) and individuals endorsing severe levels of depression or anxiety were excluded 
from participating in the study (n = 8).  General cognitive functioning was assessed using 
the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA; Nasreddine et al., 2005).  The MoCA 
provides a maximum score of 30, individuals who scored 20 and below were excluded 
because it is an indication of cognitive difficulties or difficulty with the English language 
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(Waldron-Perrine & Axelrod, 2012) (n = 1).  The Hopkins Verbal Learning Test-Revised 
(HVLT-R; Benedict, Schretlen, Groninger, & Brandt, 1998) was also administered to 
screen out any older adults with possible mild cognitive impairment; participants who 
scored below 2.5 SD from appropriate age-based mean for the total recall score were 
excluded (n = 15).  English fluency and estimated vocabulary were measured using the 
North American Adult Reading Test (NAART; Blair & Spreen, 1989).  The score on the 
NAART can be used to predict expressive vocabulary using the equation of Estimated 
Vocabulary Scaled Score = 4.112 + 0.167(NAART Score) + 0.115(years of education).  
Individuals who scored an estimated vocabulary scaled score of 7 and below were 
excluded from the study (n =10).  Two additional participants who did not finish the 
study were excluded from the analysis. 
A total of 71 participants met all the inclusion criteria; 37 young adults and 34 
older adults.  Participants ranged from 17 to 24 years old (M = 19.54 years, SD = 1.56) in 
the young adult group and ranged from 65 to 84 years old (M = 73.91, SD = 6.53) in the 
older adult group.  The number of years of education among all participants ranged from 
11 to 25 years (M = 14.74, SD = 2.69).  The older adults had more years of education 
[t(69) =-3.62, p = .001)] than young adults (see Table 2 for demographic descriptive 
statistics).  Forty-six (65%) of the participants were female.  For the majority of 
participants (66%), English was their native language.  Approximately 42% of 
participants self-identified their ethnicity as European or North American, 12% were East 
Asian such as Chinese, 10% were West Asian from the Middle East, 25% were South 
Asian such as Indian, 5% were African, and the rest endorsed belonging to an “other” 
ethnic category.  There was no difference in gender composition,χ2(1) = .26, p = .61, 
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and general cognitive functioning as measured by the MoCA t(69) = -1.44, p = .16 
between young and older adults.  There was no difference in the number of words 
recalled during the immediate trials of the HVLT-R between older and young adults, t(69) 
= 0.77, p = .442, however, there was a difference in their z score according to age-based 
normative data, t(69) = -4.35, p < .001.  Young adults had a lower z score compared to 
older adults.  There were more native English speakers in the older adult group compared 
to young adult group, χ2(1) = 5.10, p = .024.  There was also a difference between 
young and older adults in their English fluency, t(69) = -8.59, p < .001 and in their 
vocabulary score as predicted by the NAART, t(69) = -8.93, p < .001. Older adults scored 
higher on the NAART and had a higher predicted vocabulary score. Young adults 
endorsed greater symptoms of anxiety, t(69) = 4.65, p < .001, and depression, t(69) = 
2.22, p = .03, than older adults.  When asked to rate their stress from 1-10, young 
participants gave a higher stress rating than older participants, t(69) = 3.89, p < .001. 
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Table 2 
Participant Demographics 
  
 
  
Note.  MoCA is the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (Nasreddine et al., 2005); HVLT-R 
is the Hopkins Verbal Learning Test-Revised (Benedict, Schretlen, Groninger, & Brandt, 
1998); NAART is the North American Adult Reading Test (Blair & Spreen, 1989); 
HADS is the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983)  
 
 
  Young Adults	  
M (SD)	  
Older Adults	  
M (SD) 
Age in Years 
Years of Education 
Percentage of Females 
Percentage of Native English Speakers 
19.54 (1.56)	  
13.72 (1.25)	  
67% 
54%	  
73.91 (6.53) 
15.85 (3.35) 
62% 
79% 
MoCA Score 
HVLT-R Total Recall 
HVLT-R Total Recall Z-Score 
NAART Score 
Predicted Vocabulary Score  
HADS Anxiety Score 
HADS Depression Score 
Stress Rating 
26.35 (1.92) 
24.57 (3.18) 
-1.31 (0.86) 
34.11 (7.16) 
11.39 (1.24) 
7.32 (2.86) 
4.05 (3.10) 
4.70 (2.07)	  
27.03 (2.05) 
23.82 (4.82) 
-0.41 (0.87)	  
 48.21 (6.62)	  
13.99 (1.21)	  
4.50 (2.18)	  
 2.59 (2.39)	  
 2.96 (1.68)	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Measures 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (HADS) was used to assess symptoms 
of depression and anxiety.  In this self-report measure, participants were asked to report 
the frequency and severity in which they experience different symptoms.  Meta-analyses 
indicated that the HADS has high reliability and validity for assessing depression and 
anxiety in clinical and general populations (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, & Necklemann, 2002; 
Herrmann, 1997). HADS also demonstrated good homogeneity and test-retest reliabilities 
and predictability in young and older adults (Flint & Rifat, 2002; Haworth, Moniz-Cook, 
Clark, Wang, & Cleland, 2007; Mykletun, Stordal, & Dahl, 2001; Spinhoven et al., 1997).  
The Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) is a screening tool for overall 
cognitive functioning.  The MoCA assesses orientation, naming ability, short-term 
memory, episodic long term memory, attention, and language ability.  The purpose of 
using MoCA in this study was to eliminate older adults with significant cognitive 
impairments.  Research has demonstrated that the MoCA has adequate psychometric 
properties as a screening measure for detecting mild cognitive impairment or dementia 
(Hoops et al. 2009; Mitchell & Malladi, 2010; Nasreddine et al., 2005).  
The Hopkins Verbal Learning Test-Revised (HVLT-R) is a clinical measure of 
learning and memory recall.  Participants were given three trials to learn a list of 12 
words and asked to recall it immediately after the examiner read the words.  After the 
third learning trial, a delay of 20 minutes was given before participants are asked to recall 
the word list.  The HVLT-R was used in this study to screen for individuals with 
significant memory difficulties that would negatively impact their performance on the 
switching task and to screen out older adults with mild cognitive impairment and 
dementia.  Studies have shown that the HVLT-R has high sensitivity and specificity for 
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memory difficulties in dementia (Aretouli & Brandt, 2010; Hogervorst et al., 2002; 
Shapiro, Benedict, Schretlen, & Brandt, 1999). 
The North American Reading Test (NAART) is a measure of language fluency 
and predicts verbal intelligence.  Participants were presented with a card of words and 
instructed to read each word aloud.  The number of incorrectly pronounced words was 
recorded.  The NAART is highly correlated with reading ability and intelligence in the 
normal population (Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006).  Given that the verbal switching 
task used in the study requires adequate language fluency and verbal knowledge for word 
syllables and vocabulary, individuals with lower than average vocabulary levels as 
predicted by the NAART were excluded. 
Experimental Computer Tasks 
Switching paradigm.  Switching between different operations on a set of stimuli 
involves retrieval of a task set on each trial, disengaging from the irrelevant task set, and 
actively engaging in the relevant task set  (Miyake et al., 2000).  The time required to 
complete the executive control processes necessary to switch from one task to another 
includes selection from long-term memory and the configuration in working memory of 
the appropriate processing algorithms and the inhibition of previously used processing 
algorithms (Gunning-Dixon & Raz, 2003).  Research shows that participant’s reaction 
times slow down when the participant encountered the same stimuli as a previous task, 
but was required to respond differently because of negative priming of previously learned 
stimulus response bindings (Hübner, Kluwe, Luna-Rodriguez, & Peters, 2004; Wylie & 
Allport, 2000).  Similarly, switches to a task that has been abandoned only two trials 
earlier show longer reaction times than switches to a task that been abandoned less 
recently, because of the greater residual inhibition associated with the more recently 
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abandoned set (Mayr, 2001; Mayr & Kliegel, 2003).  These findings suggest that 
inhibitory control plays a role in reducing interference from irrelevant dimensions of the 
task during task shifting.  
This present study used a forced, cued-based computerized switching paradigm. In 
each paradigm, participants switched between two different tasks with two possible 
responses.  These two tasks were adapted from a study by Kray and Lindenberger (2000) 
because the tasks showed comparable performance levels during switching trials 
separately for young and older adults.  In the visual switching paradigm, participants 
decided whether the figure was a triangle or a rectangle (Task A), or whether the figure 
was coloured or grey (Task B); see Table 3 for the switching paradigm tasks.  There were 
a total of 30 figures; half triangles and half rectangles of different colours (red, blue, 
green, yellow, orange, turquoise, brown, violet) or different grey tones (ranging from 
light grey to black).  The visual switching paradigm included 26 trials of Task A and 26 
trials of Task B.  Participants were asked to switch 15 times between tasks.  Twenty 
stimuli were repeated for a different task operation at two rates: half that occurred two 
trials ago and half that occurred more than four trials ago.   
In the verbal switching paradigm, participants decided whether a word (e.g., dog) 
was an animate or inanimate object (Task A), or whether the number of syllables in the 
word was one or two (Task B); see Table 3 for the switching paradigm tasks.  There were 
a total of 48 words with four attribute combinations: (a) animate-one syllable, (b) 
animate-two syllables, (c) inanimate-one syllable, and (d) inanimate-two syllables.  The 
verbal switching paradigm consisted of 31 trials of Task A and 30 trials of Task B.  
Participants were asked to switch 16 times between tasks.  Twenty stimuli were repeated 
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for a different task operation in two varying rates: half that occurred two trials ago and 
half that occurred more than four trials ago.  
Table 3  
Switching Paradigm-Stimulus Materials and Task Set 
_____________________________________________________________________                                                                        
Stimulus          Example                 Task Sets     Response 
Materials          Items                                        Options 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Figures        Red rectangle              Colour                            Grey shade      Coloured 
                                                        Form                       Triangle           Rectangle 
Words               Dog                       Category                Inanimate        Animate 
                                                       Syllables                          One                 Two 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
The response keys for the two switching tasks were different and clearly labeled 
on the computer (see Figure 1 for the computer keys).  The ‘inanimate’ labeled key is for 
inanimate object words and the ‘animate’ labeled key is for animate object words.  The 
‘1’ labeled key is for one-syllable words and the ‘2’ labeled key is for the two-syllable 
words.  The triangle-shape labeled key is for triangle figures and square-shape labeled 
key is for rectangular figures.  The ‘black’ labeled key is for grey shaded figures and the 
‘rainbow’ labeled key is for coloured figures.     
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Figure 1. Switching paradigm response keys. 
 
 Research shows that mood induction generally lasts for a short period of time 
before mood regulation occurs (Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983; Kliegel et al., 2005).  
Therefore, the timing of cognitive tasks must be brief following mood induction in order 
to maximize mood effect.  Both switching paradigms were usually completed within five 
minutes because research shows that mood inductions only last for about five minutes 
(Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983; Kliegel et al., 2005).  For half of the participants, stimuli 
shown at the top half of the screen indicated participants should follow task A instructions 
whereas stimuli shown at the bottom half of the screen indicated that participants should 
follow task B instructions.  For the other half of participants, the top half of the screen 
was for task B and bottom half of the screen was for task A.  Participants completed both 
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON SET-SWITCHING   
 
67 
the visual and verbal switching tasks, one after the other.  The order of visual and verbal 
switching tasks was counterbalanced.   
Simple Reaction Time.  In the simple reaction time task, participants saw a cross 
in the middle of the computer screen for variable lengths of time (between 500 and 2500 
milliseconds) before the letter O was shown on the screen.  Participants were asked to 
press the space bar as quickly as possible when the letter O was shown on the screen.  A 
total of 20 trials were given and the average reaction time for the last 15 trials was used as 
a measure of participants’ general processing speed.  
N-back Task.  In this task, participants were shown letters one at a time on the 
computer screen and they decided whether each letter was the same as the one shown two 
trials ago.  Participants had to continuously remember the last two letters they saw in 
order to accurately decipher if the current letter was the same as the one they saw two 
trials ago.  The number of errors was used to measure participants working memory 
capacity.  The task included a total of 58 trials with 15 target trials. 
Mood Induction  
Films and music were used as mood-inducing stimuli because previous meta-
analyses revealed that films and music are the most effective for inducing positive and 
negative emotions (Gerrads-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994; Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & 
Hesse, 1996).  The film clips and music pieces used in this study have been found to elicit 
high happiness and sadness (Chu & Abeare, 2011; Gross & Levenson, 1995; Hagemann 
et al., 1999; Hewig et al., 2005; Mayer, Allen, & Beauregard, 1995; Tsai et al., 2000). 
The film clips and music pieces were presented on an IBM® laptop with Bose® 
headphones.   
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Positive mood was induced with a clip from the movie When Harry Meet Sally 
(Reiner, 1989), where a man and woman sit in a restaurant talking to each other, and then 
the woman leans back and starts to show signs of sexual arousal while other customers 
are watching.  Negative mood was induced with a clip from the movie The Champ 
(Lovell & Zeffirelli, 1979).  In the clip, a boxer is lying severely injured on a table, when 
his little son enters.  Neutral mood was induced with a clip from the movie Hannah and 
Her Sisters (Greenhut, Joffe, Rollins & Allen, 1986).  In the clip, two women stroll 
through the shopping centre talking.  Participants in the positive-negative group were 
shown a positive booster mood film clip at the end from the movie An Officer and a 
Gentleman (Elfand, Stewart & Hackford, 1982).  In the clip, a man strides through a 
factory, meets a woman and gives her a kiss, and then they embrace he sweeps her in his 
arms and carries her out of the factory.  The volume was set at a medium level while 
participants were watching the film.  Following the mood clip, mood congruent music 
was played while participants were completing the shifting tasks.  Music was chosen as 
previous research found that it maintains mood inductions (Gerrads-Hesse et al., 
1994).  The positive inducing music was Delibes (1870) Mazurka from Coppelia. The 
negative inducing music was Chopin (1839) Largo from Preludes.  The neutral music was 
Holst (1915) Neptune-the Mystic from The Planets.  Given the variability in individual 
detection of sound loudness, the researcher helped each participant to adjust volume level 
of the music in order for the music to be heard as playing softly in the background.   
Mood Assessment 
After the mood inductions, participants’ mood was checked to determine whether 
the mood manipulation worked.  Several past studies did not check the effectiveness of 
the mood induction at all or only checked for change in mood after induction.  Measuring 
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mood only after induction does not necessarily indicate a mood change, studies need to 
measure mood prior to and after mood induction to ensure a real mood change has 
occurred.  Research suggests that there is no clear objective way to measure the 
experience of emotion using any single measurement or profile of measurements, but 
Barrett (2006) suggested that verbal self-report might be the only means of assessing the 
experience of emotion and self-report is also the most commonly used mood 
measure.  Participants reported their mood using a self report questionnaire using a 9-
point Likert scale with four adjectives: refreshed vs. tired, calm vs. anxious, alert vs. 
unaware, positive vs. negative, approach vs. withdraw (adapted from Oaksford et al., 
1996; see Appendix A).  This self-report questionnaire is a quick assessment that 
measures mood valence, arousal, and motivation, aspects of mood consistent with the 
dimensional view of emotions.  The lower end of the scale indicates more positive 
feelings while the higher end of the scale represents more negative feelings.  The mood 
ratings were added together to produce a final score. Therefore, lower scores indicated a 
more positive mood and higher scores indicated a more negative mood. 
Computer Task Questionnaire 
Research demonstrates that the relationship between mood and cognitive 
functioning is affected by different variables such as internal or external motivation and 
level of task interest.  Yet most studies examining mood and executive function 
performance do not to take these factors into account.  Studies have found that motivation 
and task interest can fluctuate over the course of the study because an individual’s 
experience of performing a cognitive task can change their level of 
motivation.  Motivation, task interest, and task enjoyment, as well as effort, were 
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measured using self-report after each switching task using the computer task 
questionnaire (see Appendix B). 
Table 4 
Study Procedure 
______________________________________________________________________                                                                                                                              
1. Complete the consent process, including reading and signing the written consent 
form 
2. Fill out demographic questionnaire 
3. Complete the HADS 
4. Rate mood 
5. Administer the MoCA 
6. Do control components of the switching task and then practice doing switching 
task 
7. Watch neutral mood inducing film and then rate mood 
8. Listen to neutral music while performing switching paradigm 
9. Complete task questionnaire 
10. Administer the NAART 
11. Complete the simple reaction time task 
12. Watch either a positive or negative mood inducing film (e.g. positive for positive-
negative group; negative for negative-positive group) 
13. Rate mood 
14. Perform switching task while listening to mood inducing music  
15. Complete task questionnaire 
16. Administer HVLT-R immediate recall trials 
17. Complete questionnaires 
18. Do the N-back task 
19. Administer HVLT-R delay recall trial 
20. Watch either a positive or negative mood inducing film (e.g. negative for positive-
negative group; positive or negative-positive group) 
21. Rate mood 
22. Perform switching task while listening to mood inducing music  
23. Complete task questionnaire 
24. Rate mood 
25. Debrief and receive compensation for participating 
Note. HADS is the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983); 
MoCA is the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (Nasreddine et al., 2005); NAART is the 
North American Adult Reading Test (Blair & Spreen, 1989); HVLT-R is the Hopkins 
Verbal Learning Test-Revised (Benedict, Schretlen, Groninger, & Brandt, 1998)  
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Procedure 
In order to maintain consistency across participants, one IBM® computer laptop 
and a set of Bose® headphones was used for all participants.  All computerized tasks 
(control tasks, switching paradigm, N-back task, and simple reaction time task), film clips 
and music were presented on the same IBM® laptop.  Therefore, each participant partook 
in the study individually.  Young adults participated in a laboratory at the University of 
Toronto, Scarborough campus.  Older adults participated in a laboratory at Baycrest 
Hospital, Psychology department.  Both laboratories were set up in a similar fashion with 
a small desk and two chairs.  The procedure of the study is shown in Table 4.  First, 
participants completed a written informed consent form.  The consent form described the 
purpose of the study, the overall procedure of the study, the risks and benefits of 
completing the study, the anonymity and voluntary nature of the study as well as the 
compensation provided for participating.  Participants were then assigned participant 
identification numbers and asked to fill out all paperwork using their assigned number 
rather than their real name to maintain anonymity.  Next, participants filled out a 
demographic questionnaire and the HADS.  Participants were also asked to rate their 
current mood using a self-report questionnaire, which was used as an indicator of their 
baseline mood prior to any mood inductions (see Appendix A).  Then the researcher 
administered the MoCA.  Participants then completed the control component tasks of the 
switching paradigm on the laptop computer.  In these control tasks, participants 
performed each task of the switching paradigm separately.  The first task was deciding 
whether each word represented an animate or inanimate object.  Secondly, they decided 
how many syllables were present in each word.  Next, participants were shown coloured 
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objects and determined whether the shape is a triangle or rectangle.  In the last control 
task, participants determined whether the object was coloured or grey. 
After completing all four control tasks, participants completed a practice trial for 
the switching paradigm on the computer.  During these practice trials, the switching task 
was introduced and participants were given feedback on the screen if they responded 
incorrectly.  The practice trials were performed under guidance from the examiner until 
the participant understood how to complete the task (i.e. responded correctly to three 
trials).  Then the participant was shown the neutral mood-inducing film on the laptop 
using headphones and asked to rate their mood.  Next, participants completed the 
switching paradigm on the computer while listening to neutral music through the 
headphones.  Following the switching task, participants completed the computer task 
questionnaire in which they were asked to rate their task interest, motivation, and effort 
regarding the computer switching task (see Appendix B).  As a distractor task, 
participants completed the NAART and a simple reaction time task to let the mood 
induction fade.  Older participants were given the opportunity to take a five-minute break 
if they wished to do so.  During the break, participants either made conversation with the 
researcher, took a washroom break, or walked down the hallway.  Then participants were 
induced to experience either a positive or negative mood using a film clip.  Half of the 
participants were induced to experience a positive mood first (positive-negative group, n= 
31) and half were induced in a negative mood first (negative-positive group, n = 
40).  After watching the film, participants rated their mood before performing the 
switching paradigm while listening to mood congruent music.  Again, participants 
completed the computer task questionnaire.  Following the task questionnaire, 
participants were given the HVLT-R immediate recall trials.  During the time between 
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immediate and delayed recall, participants completed questionnaires not related to this 
study.  Older participants were again given the opportunity to take a five-minute break. 
Then, the N-back task was administered to participants before completing the HVLT-R 
delayed recall trial.  Following the HVLT-R, participants were induced to the other mood 
(either positive or negative) and completed the switching paradigm while listening to 
mood congruent music.  The computer task questionnaire was completed following the 
switching task.  For those participants in the positive-negative group in which a negative 
mood was recently induced, a positive mood induction film was shown to improve the 
mood of participants.  Finally, participants were asked to report their current mood one 
last time using the self-report questionnaire and then were debriefed about the study and 
provided with compensation.  Young participants were provided with course credits for 
participation and older participants were provided with transportation costs (either 
parking fee or bus tokens).  
 
Chapter III 
Results 
 Data were analyzed with a 2 (older vs. young) x 3 (neutral, happy, sad mood 
induction) mixed factorial ANOVA on each switching performance measure (switch cost, 
decision errors, and switch errors). Planned simple comparisons were used to determine if 
differences exist for performance measures between neutral, positive, and negative mood 
inductions.  A two-tailed critical alpha value of 0.05 was used. 
Mood Manipulation Check 
A mixed ANOVA was conducted to determine if the mood manipulation was 
effective with a 2 (older vs. young) x 5 (pre mood induction, neutral mood induction, 
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happy mood induction, sad mood induction and end of the study) analyses to compare 
mood ratings at the beginning of study and mood ratings made following mood 
inductions between young and older adults.  Mauchley’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity was violated, χ2(9) = 50.28, p < .05, therefore degrees of 
freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity (ε = .72). 
Observed power ranged from 0.25 to 1.00. There was a main effect for mood, F(2.90, 
199.84) = 23.63, p < .001, partial eta square = .26.  Simple contrasts showed that the 
mood induction worked because participants rated their mood as more negative after the 
negative mood induction compared to their ratings at the beginning of the study, F(1, 69) 
= 33.23, p < .001, partial eta square = .33; see Figure 2 for mood ratings in older and 
young adults.  Participants also rated their mood as more positive after the positive mood 
induction compared to their ratings at the beginning of the study, F(1, 69) = 12.95, p = 
.001, partial eta square = .16.  There was no significant difference in mood ratings at the 
beginning of the study and mood ratings after the neutral film, indicating there was no 
change in mood after the neutral film, F(1, 69) = 1.66, p  = .20, partial eta square = .02,  
There was also no significant difference between mood ratings at the beginning of the 
study and at the end of the study, F(1, 69) = .02, p = .88, partial eta square < .01; see 
Table 5 for mood ratings in young and older adults.  
There was also a main effect of age group, F(1, 69) = 13.24, p = .001, partial eta 
square =.16.  Older adults rated their mood as more positive before the mood induction, 
t(69) = 4.10, p < .001, partial eta square = .20, after the neutral mood induction, t(69) = 
2.44, p =.017, partial eta square = .08, after the positive mood induction, t(69) = 4.32, p < 
.001, partial eta square = .21, and at the end of the study, t(69) =4.19, p < .001, partial eta 
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square = .20.  This is consistent with the previous studies showing that older adults rated 
their mood as more positive than young adults.  However, there was no significant 
difference in the mood ratings of young and older adults after the negative film, t(69) 
=1.32, p = .19, partial eta square = .03.  There was also no significant interaction between 
age group and mood ratings, F(2.90, 199.84) = 2.63, p = .053, partial eta square = .04 
Table 5 
Mean Mood Ratings Following Mood Inductions of Young and Older Adults (with 
Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
  Young Adults Older Adults 
 
Pre Mood Induction  18.08 (6.83)  11.68 (6.30) 
Neutral Mood Induction 18.05 (7.19) 13.41 (8.83) 
Positive Mood Induction 16.00 (6.75) 9.94 (4.80) 
Negative Mood Induction 21.14 (7.67) 18.38 (9.88) 
Final Mood 18.84 (7.00) 11.32 (6.90) 
 
Note. Mood ratings are the average total scores from the mood self report questionnaire. 
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Figure 2. Mood ratings during the experiment for older and young adults. 
 
Control Tasks 
 A T-test was conducted to examine the difference between young and older adults 
in their performances on the control tasks.  Levene's Test for Equality of Variances was 
used to determine if variances between the young and older adult groups was equal. All 
assumption of homogeneity of variance violations were corrected by adjustments to the 
degrees of freedom using the Welch-Satterthwaite method.  Differences were found in the 
reaction times for the shape task, t(60.41)= -4.71, p < .001, r = .52, and the colour task 
t(50.70)= -5.69, p < .001, r = .62.  Older adults took longer to complete these tasks (see 
Table 6 for average reaction times and errors).  There was no difference between young 
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and older adults in the reaction time for the syllables task, t(69)= -1.53, p = .13, r = .18, 
or animate/inanimate task, t(69)= -0.49, p = .63, r = .06.  When examining the number of 
errors made, there was no difference between groups in the animate/task, t(69)= 0.34, p = 
.74, r = .04, syllables task, t(69)= -1.12, p = .27, r = .13, or shape task, t(68.95)= 1.58, p = 
.12, r = .19.  Older adults made more errors in the colour task, t(51.10)= -4.02, p = .00, r 
= .49. 
Table 6 
Average Reaction Times (RT) And Number of Errors During Control Tasks for Young 
and Older Adults (with Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 Control Task Young Adults Older Adults 
 
Animate/Inanimate   RT 
                                  Errors 
1030.34 ms (301.97) 
1.51 (1.39) 
1145.85 ms (332.37) 
1.41 (1.10) 
 
Number of Syllables RT 
                                  Errors 
1298.93 ms (463.63) 
2.43 (2.81) 
1357.72 ms (543.56) 
1.76 (2.13) 
 
Shape                        RT 
                                  Errors 
610.67 ms (145.91) 
0.43 (0.55) 
806.20 ms (197.77) 
0.24 (0.50) 
 
Colour                         RT 
                                  Errors 
849.68 ms (246.41) 
0.70 (1.10) 
1338.82 ms (442.65) 
2.24 (1.95) 
 
Switching Analyses 
Switching cost was measured by subtracting reaction time (RT) on non-switch 
trials in switching conditions from RT on switch trials in switch conditions.  Participant 
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errors were examined for switch errors, which are failures to switch between tasks (e.g. 
indicating number of syllables when task was to determine shape) and decision errors, 
which are selecting the wrong response within a correct task set (e.g. deciding an animal 
as inanimate).   
Neutral mood.  One way ANOVA was conducted to examine the difference 
between young and older adults in their performances on the switching paradigm 
following neutral mood induction with age group as a between subjects variable and 
switch cost, decision errors, switching errors for visual and verbal switching task as 
dependent variables.  Levene's Test for Equality of Variances was used to determine if 
variances between the young and older adult groups was equal.  All assumption of 
homogeneity of variance violations was corrected by adjustments to the degrees of 
freedom using the Welch method.  In the verbal switch task, no differences between age 
group were found in switch cost, F(69)= 2.92, p =.092, r = .20,  number of decision 
errors, F(35.87) = 1.15, p = .244, r = .18, or number of switch errors, F(36.49) = 2.96, p = 
.106, r = .27.  For the visual switch task, there was no difference between young and older 
adults in the switch cost, F(69)= 2.73, p =.103, r = .20, but older and young adults differ 
in the number of decision errors, F(33.75) = 7.06, p = .016, r = .42 and  number of switch 
errors, F(35.36) = 4.75, p = .044, r = .34.  Older adults made a greater amount of errors 
than young adults (see Table 7 for switching performance means and standard deviations 
among young and older adults).  
Comparison between mood inductions.  A 2 (age group) x 3 (mood condition) 
mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted to examine differences between specific 
switching performance measures (switch cost, decision errors, switch errors) after mood 
induction (neutral, positive and negative mood) as within subject variables and between 
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age groups (young and older adults) as a between subject variable. Given that violation of 
sphericity can produces biases in the F-tests, Bonferroni correction was used to control 
for Type 1 error rate. Simple contrasts were used to examine the difference between 
negative and neutral moods, and between positive and neutral moods.  When the 
assumption of sphericity was violated, the degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity.  A T-test examining performance difference 
between negative-positive order and positive-negative order among all participants found 
no difference in switching performance, indicating no order effects. 
Verbal switch task.  A 2 (age group) x 3 (mood condition) mixed factorial 
ANOVA was conducted on verbal switch cost.  There was no main effect for mood 
condition, F(2, 138) = .74, p = .48, r = .007, or age group, F(1, 69) = 1.44, p = .23, r = 
.14.  There was no interaction between age group and mood condition, F(2, 138) = 1.08, p 
= .34, r = .09.  The same analysis was done on decision errors and there was no main 
effect for mood condition, F(1.07, 73.99) = 0.76, p = .40, r = .10, age group F(1, 69) = 
0.57, p = .45., r = .09, or interaction between mood condition and age group, F(1.07, 
73.99) = 1.88, p = .16, r = .16.  Similarly for the number of switch errors, there was no 
main effect for mood, F(1.37, 94.78) = 1.94, p = .16, r = .14, or age group, F(1, 69) = 
.071, p = .40, r = .03.  There was a significant interaction between mood condition and 
age group, F(1.37, 94.78) = 3.56, p = .049, r = .19; see Table 7.  Young adults made a 
similar amount of switch errors across mood inductions whereas older adults made fewer 
errors following positive and negative mood inductions compared to neutral mood (see 
Figure 3).  Overall observed power for verbal switch task analyses ranged from .116 to 
.541 (M = .24).   
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Figure 3. Switching errors in the verbal switch task following mood inductions for young 
and older adults. 
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Table 7 
Young and Older Adults Switching Performance Across Mood Inductions (with Standard 
Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
Verbal Switch Task	   Neutral Mood	   Positive Mood	   Negative Mood 
	  
Switch Cost  
          Young Adults 
          Older Adults	  
 
397.77 ms (250.59)  
529.91 ms (391.66)	  
 
455.83 ms (296.78) 
534.57 ms (405.00)	  
 
439.98 ms (265.22) 
458.52 ms (337.18)	  
Decision Errors 
          Young Adults 
          Older Adults	  
 
2.08 (2.29) 
4.26 (10.53)	  
 
2.41 (2.54) 
2.21 (2.31)	  
 
2.70 (2.12) 
2.41 (2.41)	  
Switching Errors 
          Young Adults 
          Older Adults	  
 
0.73 (1.24) 
2.24 (5.16)	  
 
1.11 (1.98) 
0.59 (1.28) 
 
0.78 (1.20) 
0.76 (1.89) 
	  
Visual Switch Task 
	  
   
Switch Cost  
          Young Adults 
          Older Adults	  
 
369.49 ms (272.16) 
537.83 ms (551.40)	  
 
295.28 ms (255.36) 
201.60 ms (278.72)	  
 
281.16 ms (213.77) 
286.64 ms (249.76)	  
Decision Errors 
          Young Adults 
          Older Adults	  
 
0.84 (1.14) 
5.35 (10.27)	  
 
0.81 (1.15) 
4.12 (8.57)	  
 
1.30 (1.73) 
2.44 (4.24)	  
Switching Errors 
          Young Adults 
          Older Adults	  
 
0.54 (0.93) 
2.26 (4.72)	  
 
1.22 (1.90) 
1.09 (3.55)	  
 
1.03 (1.59) 
0.71 (1.80)	  
 
 
Visual switch task.  A 2 (age group) x 3 (mood condition) mixed factorial 
ANOVA was performed on the visual switch cost, there was a main effect for mood 
condition, F(1.35, 93.05) = 8.93, p = .001, r = .30.  Contrasts indicated that in general 
participants had a reduced switch cost in a positive mood (M = 248.43, SD = 31.69) 
compared to neutral mood (M = 453.67, SD = 50.96), t(62.36) = 205. 23, p = .005, r = 
0.99.  Participants also had a reduced switch cost in a negative mood compared (M = 
283.84, SD = 27.52) to neutral mood, t(57.89) = 169.77, p = .014, r = 99.  There was no 
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difference between positive and negative moods in their switch cost, t(29.13) = 35.46, p = 
.68, r = .99.  There was no main effect for age group, F(1, 69)= 0.32, p = .57, r = .07. 
Although the interaction between age group and mood condition did not reach 
significance, F(1.35, 93.05) = 3.25, p = .06, r =.18, there was a trend indicating that 
young adults performed similarly between positive and neutral moods whereas older 
adults performed better in a positive compared to neutral mood; see Table 7.  
A 2 (age group) x 3 (mood condition) mixed factorial ANOVA was done in the 
number of decision errors. The main effect for mood condition was not significant, 
F(1.59, 109.93) = 1.50, p =  .23, r = .12.  A main effect for age group was significant, 
F(1, 69) = 7.70, p = .007, r = . 32.  Older adults made more decision errors than young 
adults, t(1.08) = 2.99, p = .007, r = .94; see Table 7.  The interaction between mood 
condition and age group did not reach significance, F(1.59, 109.93) = 2.91, p = .07, r = 
.16, but there was a trend for young adults to make similar number of errors whereas 
older adults made fewer errors in a negative mood to neutral mood. 
 A similar analysis was done for the number of switch errors, no main effect for 
mood condition, F(1.80, 124.31) = 1.10, p = .33, r = . 09, or age group, F(1, 69) = 0.76, p 
= .39, r = .10, was found.  There was a significant interaction between mood condition 
and age group, F(1.80. 124.31) = 4.87, p = .012, r = .19. Generally, older adults made 
fewer switch errors following positive and negative mood inductions compared to neutral 
mood induction whereas young adults made more switch errors in positive mood 
compared to neutral mood and no difference between negative and neutral moods (see 
Figure 4).  Overall observed power for visual switch task analyses ranged from .087 to 
.909 (M = 0.46).   
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Figure 4. Switching errors in the visual switch task following mood inductions for young 
and older adults. 
 
 ANCOVA. Given that working memory and processing speed have been found to 
affect set switching performance in older adults, these variables were entered as 
covariates in an ANCOVA.  The same previously mentioned 2 (age group) x 3 (mood 
condition) mixed factorial ANOVA was performed with the average reaction time in the 
reaction time task and the number of errors in the N-back task entered as covariates.  
Verbal switch task. A 2 (age group) x 3 (mood condition) mixed factorial 
ANOVA was performed for the verbal switch cost with covariates, there was no main 
effect for mood condition, F(2, 134) = 2.00, p = .14, r = .12, or age group, F(1, 67) = 
0.32, p = .576, r = .07.  There was no interaction between mood condition and reaction 
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time, F(1, 67) = 2.16, p = .119, r = .18, or mood condition and N-back errors, F(1, 67) = 
0.07, p = .931, r = .032.  There was also no interaction between age group and mood 
condition, F(2, 134) = 0.34, p = .712, r = .05.  
A similar analysis was done for decision and switch errors, there was no main 
effect for mood condition, F(1.07, 71.89) = 0.23, p = .648, r = .05, or age group, F(1, 67) 
= 0.42, p = .517, r = .08, or interaction between mood condition and age group, F(1.07, 
71.89) = 2.46, p = .119, r = .018 for decision errors.  No interactions were found between 
mood condition and the covariates of reaction time, F(1.07, 71.89) = 0.02, p = .897, r = 
.017, and N-back errors, F(1.07, 71.89) = 0.87, p = .119, r = .109 for decision errors.  
There was no main effect for mood condition, F(1.37, 92.01) = 0.20, p = .732, r = .05, or 
age group,  F(1, 69) = 0.07, p = .40, r = .03, in switch errors.  There was no interaction 
for mood condition and reaction time, F(1.37, 92.01) = 0.18, p = .749, r = .044, or mood 
condition and N-back errors, F(1.37, 92.01) = 1.95, p = .161, r = 144.  However, there 
was a significant interaction between mood condition and age group, F(1.37, 92.01) = 
4.28, p = .029, r = .21; see Figure 5.  After taking into account covariates, young adults 
made a similar amount of switch errors across mood inductions whereas older adults 
made fewer errors during positive and negative mood inductions compared to neutral 
mood; see Table 8 for the means and standard errors for switch errors after accounting for 
covariates.  Overall observed power for verbal switch task analyses ranged from .053 to 
.602 (M = .20). 
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Table 8 
Young and Older Adults Average Switch Errors for Verbal Switch Task Across Mood 
Inductions with Standard Errors and Confidence Intervals 
 
 
Group Mood Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Adults 
Neutral .703* .632 -.559 1.965 
Positive .941* .253 .436 1.446 
Negative 1.218* .285 .649 1.787 
Older Adults 
Neutral 2.264* .661 .944 3.584 
Positive .594* .265 .066 1.122 
Negative .469* .298 -.126 1.063 
 
Note. *The number of switch errors following mood inductions are estimates after taking 
into account the covariates of average reaction time = 449.37 and N-back task errors = 
4.80. 
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Figure 5. Switching errors in the verbal switch task following mood inductions after 
controlling for covariates for young and older adults.  The number of switching errors 
following mood inductions are estimates after taking into account covariates of average 
reaction time = 449.37 and N-back task errors = 4.80. 
 
Visual switch task. A 2 (age group) x 3 (mood condition) mixed factorial ANOVA 
was performed for visual switch cost with covariates of reaction time and n-back errors. 
There was no main effect for mood condition, F(1.35, 90.70) = 0.34, p = .712, r = .06, or 
age group, F(1, 67)= 0.201, p = .655, r = .05, in the visual switch cost.  Interactions were 
not significant for mood condition and reaction time, F(1.35, 90.70) = 0.07, p = .865, r = 
.027, or for mood condition and N-back errors, F(1.35, 90.70) = 0.92, p = .367, r = .10.  
The interaction between age group and mood condition almost reached significance, 
F(1.35, 90.70) = 3.51, p = .051, r = .19.  Examining performances, young adults 
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performed similarly between positive and neutral moods whereas older adults performed 
better in a positive compared to neutral mood; see Table 9 for means and standard errors 
for visual switch task cost after accounting for covariates.  
 
Table 9 
Young and Older Adults Average Switch Cost for Visual Switch Task Across Mood 
Inductions with Standard Errors and Confidence Intervals 
 
Group Mood 
Induction 
Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound 
Upper Bound 
Young 
Adults 
Neutral 361.936* 73.370 215.489 508.383 
Positive 301.256* 45.839 209.761 392.751 
Negative 288.360* 39.735 209.049 367.671 
Older Adults 
Neutral 546.060* 76.745 392.876 699.244 
Positive 195.088* 47.948 99.384 290.792 
Negative 278.800* 41.563 195.840 361.759 
 
 
Note. *Switch cost following mood inductions are estimates after taking into account the 
covariates of average reaction time = 449.37 and N-back task errors = 4.80. 
 
Regarding decision errors, 2 (age group) x 3 (mood condition) mixed factorial 
ANOVA with covariates found a main effect for mood condition, F(1.57, 105.22) = 3.95, 
p =  .31, r = .19.  Participants made the most errors in a neutral mood (M = 3.06, SD = 
0.83), fewer errors in a positive mood (M = 2.42, SD = 0.64) and the fewest errors in a 
negative mood (M = 1.86, SD = 0.36) after controlling for covariates.  There was no main 
effect for age group, F(1, 67) = 2.30, p = .134, r = .18.  The interaction between mood 
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condition and reaction time, F(1.57, 105.22) = 4.62, p = .019, r = .205, was significant. 
There was no interaction between mood condition and N-back errors, F(1.57, 105.22) = 
0.44, p = .595, r = .065, or mood condition and age group, F(1.57, 105.22) = 1.60, p = 
.210, r = .12.   
The same mixed ANOVA performed in switch errors found a main effect for 
mood condition, F(1.59, 106.38) = 3.68, p = .038, r = .18.  Similar to decision errors, 
participants made the most errors in a neutral mood (M = 4.45, SD = 1.14), fewer errors in 
a positive mood (M = 3.56, SD = 0.91) and the least number of errors in a negative mood 
(M = 2.71, SD = 0.48) after taking into account covariates.  No main effect for age group 
was found in switch errors, F(1, 67) = 0.91, p = .344, r = .12.  The interaction between 
mood condition and reaction time was significant, F(1.59, 106.38) = 3.40, p = .041, r = 
.18.  No interaction was found between mood condition and N-back errors, F(1.59, 
106.38) = 0.88, p = .408, r = .091, or between mood condition and age group, F(1.59, 
106.38) = 2.03, p = .146, r = .14.  General observed power for visual switch task analyses 
ranged from .059 to 697 (M = .33).   
Inhibition Analyses 
Research suggests that the ability to inhibit plays a role in task shifting because it 
reduces interference from irrelevant dimensions of the task.  In our study, interference 
from irrelevant dimensions was examined by using repeated stimuli for a different task 
operation (e.g. see “cow” and asked to do Task A and then see “cow” again but asked to 
do Task B).  Inhibitory control was measured by subtracting reaction time for repeated 
stimuli that occurred two trials ago (short trials) from reaction time for repeated stimuli 
that occurred more than four trials ago (long trials).  Reduced inhibitory control was 
defined as greater reaction times on recently repeated trials than previously repeated trials 
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in the switching conditions and making more errors when responding to the repeated 
trials.  A T- test found no difference in inhibition performance between negative-positive 
order and positive-negative order among participants, suggesting no order effects.  
Neutral mood.  One way ANOVA was conducted to examine the difference 
between young and older adults in their performances in their inhibition performance 
following neutral mood induction with age group as a between subject variable and 
inhibitory control and errors for visual and verbal switching task as dependent variables.  
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances was used to determine if variances between the 
young and older adult groups was equal.  All assumption of homogeneity of variance 
violations was corrected by adjustments to the degrees of freedom using the Welch 
method.  Significant differences between age group were found in inhibitory control, 
F(69)= 4.27, p =.043, r = .24 and inhibition errors made F(69) = 4.45, p = .038, r = .25 in 
the verbal switch task.  Older adults had a larger switch cost and more errors than young 
adults (see Table 10 for inhibition performance means and standard deviations among 
young and older adults).  There was also a difference between young and older adults in 
the switch cost, F(69)= 9.31, p =.003, r = .34, and the number of inhibition errors, 
F(33.72) = 8.00, p = .010, r = .44, in the visual switch task.  Similar to the verbal task, 
older adults had a larger switch cost and more errors than young adults; see Table 10.    
Comparison between mood inductions.  A 2 (age group) x 3 (mood condition) 
mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted to examine differences between specific  
inhibition performance measures (inhibitory control and errors) after mood inductions 
(neutral, positive and negative mood) as within subject variables and between age groups 
(young and older adults) as a between subject variable. Given that violation of sphericity 
can produces biases in the F-tests, Bonferroni correction was used to control for Type 1 
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error rate. Violations of sphericity were corrected using the degrees of freedom were 
corrected from Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity.  Simple contrasts were used to 
examine the difference between negative and neutral moods, and between positive and 
neutral moods.  
 Verbal switch task.   A 2 (age group) x 3 (mood condition) mixed factorial 
ANOVA performed for inhibitory control found no main effect for mood condition, 
F(1.57, 108.59) = 1.55, p = 215, r = .12, or age group, F(1, 69) = 1.73, p = .193, r = .15.  
The interaction between mood condition and age group was not significant, F(1.57, 
108.59) = 2.57, p = .094, r = .15.  The same analysis done on errors, there was no main 
effect of mood condition, F(1.22, 83.93) = 1.28, p = .281. r = .12, or age group F(1, 69) = 
-0.46, p = .50, r = .08.  Interaction for mood condition and age group approached 
significance, F(1.22, 83.93) = 3.54, p = .055, r = .20.  Young adults showed no difference 
in errors across different moods.  Older adults made fewer errors following positive and 
negative mood compared to neutral mood, with the least amount of errors in a positive 
mood (see Figure 6).  General observed power for verbal switch task analyses ranged 
from .102 to .506 (M = .30). 
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Figure 6. Inhibition errors in the verbal switch task following mood inductions for young 
and older adults. 
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Table 10 
Young and Older Adults Inhibition Performance Across Mood Inductions (with Standard 
Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
Verbal Switch Task	   Neutral Mood	   Positive Mood	   Negative Mood 
	  
Inhibitory Control  
          Young Adults 
          Older Adults	  
 
461.89 ms (405.11) 
517.05 ms (449.76)	  
 
277.31 ms (529.08) 
546.98 ms (570.60) 
 
389.78 ms (383.55) 
332.45 ms (365.19)	  
Inhibition Errors 
          Young Adults 
          Older Adults	  
 
0.84 (1.19) 
2.09 (4.84)	  
 
1.19 (1.29) 
0.62 (0.95)	  
 
1.16 (1.14) 
1.18 (1.42) 
	  
Visual Switch Task 
	  
   
Inhibitory Control 
          Young Adults 
          Older Adults 	  
 
91.13 ms (396.56) 
429.55 ms (533.19)	  
 
92.26 ms (460.53) 
10.50 ms (302.74)	  
 
98.99 ms (368.78) 
74.68 ms (370.65)	  
Inhibition Errors 
          Young Adults 
          Older Adults	  
 
0.41 (0.60) 
2.97 (5.49)	  
 
0.78 (1.03) 
2.09 (4.55)	  
 
0.78 (1.25) 
1.29 (2.36)	  
 
Visual switch task.  A 2 (age group) x 3 (mood condition) mixed factorial 
ANOVA was done on inhibitory control.  A main effect for mood condition in inhibitory 
control, F(1.72, 118.92) = 5.05, p = .011, r = .20.  Participants showed better inhibitory 
control in a positive mood than neutral mood, t(82.40) = 208.95, p = .04, r = .99, as well 
as in a negative mood than neutral mood, t(68.28) = 173.50, p = .04, r = .85; see Table 10.  
Participants also performed better in a positive mood compared to negative mood, 
t(58.24) = 35.45, p = .04, r = .98.  There was no main effect for age group, F(1, 69) = 
2.01, p = .161, r = .17.  The interaction between mood condition and age group was 
significant for inhibitory control, F(1.72, 118.92) = 5.25, p = . 009, r = .21.  Young adults 
performances were similar across the different mood inductions whereas older adults 
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performed better following positive and negative mood inductions than neutral mood.  
Older adults performed best in the positive mood induction (see Figure 7).   
 
 
Figure 7. Inhibitory control in the visual switch task following mood inductions for 
young and older adults. 
 
A similar mixed factorial ANOVA performed on inhibitory errors, there was no 
main effect for mood condition, F(1.62, 111.52) = 1.28, p = .278, r = .11, but there was a 
main effect for age group, F (1, 69) = 6.82, p = . 011, r = .30. Older adults made more 
errors than young adults, t(0.60) = 1.46, p = .011, r = .88; see Table 10.  The interaction 
between mood condition and age group approached significance, F(1.62, 111.52) = 3.20, 
p = .055, r = .17.  Young adults made a similar number of errors across all mood 
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inductions whereas older adults made fewer errors when in a negative mood and positive 
mood compared to neutral mood (see Figure 8).  Overall observed power for visual task 
analysis ranged from .247 to .782 (M = .56). 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Inhibition errors in the visual switch task following mood inductions for young 
and older adults. 
 
ANCOVA.  Given that working memory and processing speed affect cognitive 
performance in older adults, these variables were entered as covariates in an ANCOVA. 
A 2 (age group) x 3 (mood condition) mixed factorial ANOVA was performed with the 
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average reaction time in the reaction time task and the number of errors in the N-back 
task entered as covariates.  
Verbal switch task.  A 2 (age group) x 3 (mood condition) mixed factorial 
ANOVA with the covariates was performed for the inhibitory control, no main effect was 
found for mood condition, F(1.58, 105.63) = 0.70, p = .466, r = .08, or age group, F(1, 
67) = 0.35, p = .562, r = .07.  None of the interactions were significant for mood 
condition and reaction time, F(1.58, 105.63) = 0.27, p = .708, r = .05, mood condition and 
N-back errors, F(1.58, 105.63) = 0.43, p = .607, r = .06, or mood condition and age 
group, F(1.58, 105.63) = 1.80, p = .177, r = .13.  A similar mixed factorial ANOVA 
performed on inhibitory errors found no main effect for mood condition, F(1.22, 81.73) = 
0.07, p = .934, r = .03, or age group F(1, 67) = 0.23, p = .630, r = .06.  No interaction was 
found between mood condition and reaction time, F(1.22, 81.73) = 0.03, p = .896, r = .02, 
or mood condition and N-back errors, F(1.22, 81.73) = 1.16, p = .297, r = .118.  There 
was a significant interaction between mood condition and age group, F(1.22, 81.73) = 
3.93, p = .043, r = .21; see Figure 9.  Young adults made a similar number of errors 
across mood inductions whereas older adults made fewer errors in a negative and positive 
mood compared to neutral mood (see Table 11).  Overall observed power ranged from 
.054 to .549 (M = .17).    
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Table 11 
Young and Older Adults Average Inhibition Errors for Verbal Switch Task Across Mood 
Inductions with Standard Errors and Confidence Intervals 
 
 
Group Mood Mean Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Young 
Adults 
Neutral .872* .616 -.357 2.100 
Positive 1.260* .500 .262 2.257 
Negative .949* .307 .337 1.561 
Older 
Adults 
Neutral 2.463* .644 1.178 3.749 
Positive 1.570* .523 .527 2.614 
Negative 1.114* .321 .474 1.755 
 
 
Note. *Inhibition errors following mood inductions are estimates after taking into account 
the covariates of N-back task errors = 4.80 and average reaction time = 449.37. 
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Figure 9.  Inhibtion errors in the verbal switch task following mood inductions after 
controlling for covariates for young and older adults.  Inhibition errors following mood 
inductions are estimates after taking into account the covariates of N-back task errors = 
4.80 and average reaction time = 449.37. 
 
Visual switch task.  A 2 (age group) x 3 (mood condition) mixed factorial 
ANOVA with covariates of reaction time and n-back errors for inhibitory control.  There 
was no main effect for mood condition, F(1.33, 88.95) = 0.82, p = .400, r = .10, or age 
group, F(1, 67) = 1.67, p = .201, r = .16, was found in inhibitory control.  No interaction 
was found between mood condition and reaction time, F(1.33, 88.95) = 2.08, p = .147, r = 
.15, or mood condition and N-back errors, F(1.33, 88.95) = 0.71, p = .441, r = .088.  The 
interaction between age group and mood condition was significant, F(1.33, 88.95) = 3.62, 
p = .049,, r = .20; see Figure 10.  Both young and older adults had better inhibitory 
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control in a negative mood compared to neutral mood (see Table 12).  Older adults also 
showed better inhibitory control in a positive mood than neutral mood whereas there was 
no difference for young adults.  
 
Table 12 
Young and Older Adults Average Inhibitory Control for Visual Switch Task Across Mood 
Inductions with Standard Errors and Confidence Intervals 
 
 
Group  Mean Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Young 
Adults 
 117.683* 78.150 -38.305 273.671 
 98.692* 67.591 -36.221 233.605 
 107.872* 62.844 -17.565 233.309 
Older 
Adults 
 400.650* 81.745 237.486 563.814 
 3.506* 70.701 -137.613 144.625 
 65.019* 65.735 -66.189 196.226 
 
 
Note. *Inhibition control following mood inductions are estimates after taking into 
account the covariates of N-back task errors = 4.80 and average reaction time = 449.37. 
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Figure 10. Inhibitory control in the visual switch task following mood inductions after 
controlling for covariates for young and older adults.  Inhibition control following mood 
inductions are estimates after taking into account the covariates of N-back task errors = 
4.80 and average reaction time = 449.37. 
 
A similar mixed factorial ANOVA with covariates was performed on inhibitory 
errors. The main effect for mood condition approached significance, F(1.62, 108.81) = 
3.12, p = .059, r = .17.  There was a trend in which participants made fewer errors in a 
negative mood (M = 1.03, SD = 0.22) compared to neutral mood (M = 1.67, SD = 0.43) 
after covariates were held constant.  There was no main effect for age group for inhibitory 
errors, F(1, 67) = 1.631, p = .206, r = . 15. No interaction was found or mood condition 
and N-back errors, F(1.62, 108.81) = 0.48, p = .584, r = .066.  Interaction between mood 
condition and reaction time was significant, F(1.62, 108.81) = 3.78, p = .034, r = .18.  
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Interaction between mood condition and inhibitory errors was not significant, F(1.62, 
108.81) = 1.68, p = .197, r = .12.  Observed power ranged from .085 to .629 (M = .32).     
Mood as Facilitator Theory Analyses 
Previous studies have not adequately addressed mood as a facilitator theory.  The 
mood as a facilitator theory suggests that positive mood should be associated with greater 
switching abilities if task interest, enjoyment and motivation levels are high.  However, if 
task interest and motivation is low, participants in a positive mood should have reduced 
switching performance.  The ratings for task interest, enjoyment and motivation were 
combined into one score (higher scores indicated greater task enjoyment, interest and 
motivation levels) and participants were separated into two groups using a median split: 
those who reported low scores after the positive mood induction (37 people who scored 
less than or equal to 29) and those who scored high after the positive mood induction (34 
people who scored greater than 29).  T-tests were conducted between the two groups for 
differences in their switching and inhibition performance (switch cost, decision errors, 
switching errors, inhibitory control, and inhibitory errors).  The two groups showed no 
difference in the verbal switching task’s switch cost, t(69) = 0.24, p = .81, r = .03, 
decision errors, t(69) = 1.44, p = .16, r = .17, or switching errors, t(69) = 1.01, p = .31, r = 
.12, while in a positive mood.  There was a significant difference in the visual switching 
task’s switch cost, t(69) = 2.33, p = .023, r = .27.  Specifically, participants in the low 
motivation group showed a higher switch cost (M = 319.52, SD = 300.95) than 
participants in the high motivation group (M = 175.21, SD =208.68).  A significant 
difference was found between motivation groups and the number of switching type errors, 
t(37.72) = 2.40, p = .022, r = .36.  Participants in the low motivation group made more 
switching type errors (M = 1.86, SD = 3.72) than participants in the high motivation 
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group (M = 0.38, SD = 0.55).  There was no difference in decision type errors, t(40.54) = 
1.26, p = .215, r = .19, following positive mood.  
 
Chapter IV 
Discussion 
This study aimed to examine the effect of mood changes on shifting abilities in 
young and older adults.  Several of the current theories proposed to explain the effect of 
mood on cognitive processing were also investigated.  Contrary to our expectations that 
young adults would show different mood effects on their shifting abilities in a forced 
switching task, young adults generally did not differ in their switching performance 
across mood inductions.  There were no differences in young adults’ switch cost between 
neutral mood and positive mood and between neutral mood and negative mood for the 
verbal switch task.  In the visual switch task, there was no difference in switch costs but 
young adults made more switch errors following a positive mood compared to neutral 
mood in the visual switch task. There was no difference in switch errors between negative 
and neutral mood. These results are consistent with many previous studies demonstrating 
positive mood is associated with greater switch costs in forced switching tasks (Chu & 
Abeare, 2011; Phillips, Bull et al., 2002; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004).  This study adds 
to the literature by using a within subject design with demonstrated changes in mood in a 
positive direction following a positive mood induction. The results of this study suggest 
that positive mood reduces set switching abilities among young adults.  No difference was 
found in their ability to inhibit and reduce interference from irrelevant dimensions of the 
task during switching across different mood inductions.  This is inconsistent with past 
research showing that positive and negative mood did not affect inhibitory control 
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(Chepenik et al., 2007; Martin & Kerns, 2011; Stafford et al., 2010).  Our study results 
were similar to Larson and colleagues (2013) found that low arousal, negative mood such 
as feeling sad does not affect inhibition. 
To my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the effects of mood 
induction on set switching abilities in older adults.  I predicted that older adults would 
either show decreased switching performance when induced in a positive and negative 
mood compared to a neutral mood because of increased emotional processing load 
affecting their task performance or they would show no difference in their performance 
across the different mood inductions due to well developed emotional regulation skills. 
Contrary to our predictions, older adults showed better switching performance with 
reduced switch cost and/or fewer switch errors in the visual and verbal switch task while 
induced in a positive or negative mood compared to a neutral mood.  This improved 
switching performance was robust even after taking into account important variables 
related to performance in older adults such as working memory and processing speed.  
Older adults showed better inhibitory control and made fewer inhibition errors in positive 
and negative moods during the switching paradigm than they did in a neutral mood. 
Again these findings were still evident even after controlling for the covariates of 
working memory and processing speed.  These findings contrast with Phillips and 
colleagues’ (2002) results showing that older adults demonstrated poorer performance on 
a planning task when induced in a positive or negative mood compared to neutral mood.  
However, although both planning and set switching are considered to be executive 
functioning, planning is more related to the updating and inhibition functions whereas our 
computerized shifting task is more related to shifting abilities (Miyake et al., 2000).  
Phillips’ study used a between subjects design whereas this study utilized a within 
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subjects design.  The greater number of participants and the within subjects design in this 
study provide a more powerful examination of mood effects.  
We propose a few possible explanations for these results.  First, there is evidence 
that older adults are better able to regulate their emotions so that it does not negatively 
impact their cognitive performance (Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields, 2009).  Young adults 
showed a reduced task performance when asked to engage in regulating emotion while 
performing a working memory task whereas older adults showed no decline in their 
performance when asked to regulate their emotion during the task.  Older adults in our 
study may have placed greater focus on the switching task to regulate their mood and 
therefore, showed better performance in positive and negative moods during the visual 
switching task.  Focusing on the task itself may be an emotional regulation strategy.  
Older adults may have been trying to repair their negative mood by focusing on the task 
at hand and maintaining their positive mood by engaging in the task to beat their previous 
performance.   
Another possible reason why older adults performed better in positive and 
negative mood inductions compared to neutral mood is changes in arousal.  Given that 
older adults showed few differences in their performance between positive and negative 
mood, mood arousal rather than mood valence changes may be contributing to the 
performance enhancement.  As previous mentioned, the amount of arousal on 
performance follows an inverted U pattern (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908).  The positive and 
negative mood inductions may have changed older participants’ arousal levels to an 
optimal amount leading to improved task performance.  Arousal levels among older 
adults were examined using the aware-unaware scale on the mood self-report measure.  
Older adults reported increased arousal following the positive mood (M = 1.91, SD = 
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1.38) compared to neutral mood (M = 2.59, SD = 2.00), t(33) = 2.72, p = .010, r = .43, 
and compared to negative mood (M = 3.29, SD = 2.21), t(33) = -4.26, p < .001, r = .60.  
However, older adults reported lower arousal in negative compared to neutral mood, t(33) 
= -3.08, p = .004, r = .47.  While arousal may have accounted for the improved 
performance in positive mood, it does not adequately explain the negative mood findings.  
Alternatively, our results may be explained by practice effects because 
participants first performed the set-switching task in a neutral mood before they did the 
switching task again in positive and negative mood inductions.  Research shows that 
practicing switching between specific tasks reduces the switch cost (Allport et al., 1994, 
Meiran, 1996).  It may be that older adults got better at doing the switching tasks because 
they had practiced the task.  Older adults have specifically shown to benefit from practice 
by showing greater reduced switch costs and better accuracy than young adults over 
several sessions of set switching (Cepeda, Kramer, & Sather, 2001; Kramer, Hahn, & 
Gopher, 1999).  Following this line of logic, young adults should show practice effects 
too.  There is some evidence for improved switching cost and reduced inhibitory control 
in the visual switching task for positive and negative moods compared to neutral moods 
for young adults.  However, performances in young adults were generally not 
significantly different across mood inductions.  It is possible that young adults’ attempts 
at mood regulation following positive and negative mood induction reduced their 
switching performance and thereby eliminating the practice effect.  Consistent with the 
idea that young adults have difficulty with cognitive task performance while regulating 
emotions, Scheibe and Blanchard-Fields (2009) found that young adults showed a 
reduced task performance when asked to engage in regulating emotion while performing 
a working memory task.  
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When examining task performance differences between older and young adults 
while in a neutral mood, majority of the findings from this study are consistent with the 
literature showing that older adults perform worse than young adults.  Generally, older 
adults took longer than young adults to complete most of the control tasks, consistent 
with research showing that older adults have slower decision speed (Salthouse, 1995; Uttl 
& Graf, 1997).  Older and young adults showed similar performances on the control tasks 
of the verbal switch task (deciding on the number of syllables and whether the word is 
animate or inanimate for each word).  Older adults in this study had greater language 
fluency and vocabulary, which may have given them a slight advantage to overcome their 
general reaction time disadvantage compared to young adults.  When examining the 
errors, older and young participants were similar in their performance except for the 
colour task; older participants made more errors when deciding whether the figure was a 
colour or shades of grey.  During the control trials, some of the older adults reported 
mistakenly thinking that the lighter shades of grey were blue and therefore responded 
incorrectly to colour in those instances.  
When participants engaged in a cued based switching task after the neutral mood 
induction, which served as a baseline performance, there was no difference between 
young and older adults for their switch cost but older adults made more errors in the 
visual switching task.  Older adults also showed reduced inhibitory control compared to 
young adults during the visual switching task.  Consistent with our predictions and the 
literature, older adults showed reduced set switching abilities and inhibitory control in 
comparison to young adults.  Looking at both the switch cost and the errors made are 
important in examining set switching performance because participants may not show 
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differences in their switch cost but may make more errors because of speed accuracy 
tradeoffs. 
  When examining differences between older and young adults across mood 
inductions, older and young adults performed similarly with regards to their switching 
and inhibitory control for both switching tasks.  There were group differences in the 
errors made.  Interestingly, older adults made more decision type errors and fewer 
switching type errors than young adults in the visual switch task.  Older adults made more 
inhibitory errors than young adults while doing the visual switching task.  The switching 
and decision type errors have been found to measure two different things.  Arbuthnott and 
Frank (2000) found that errors of failing to switch tasks (switching errors) are related to 
difficulty switching between tasks whereas errors in selecting the appropriate response 
(decision errors) are related to task specific process such as task difficulty rather than the 
switch process.  This may explain the difference in performance between older and young 
adults.  Older adults are better at switching following a positive mood than young adults 
as they made fewer switching errors.  But older adults struggled to choose the right 
response in the specific task.  Recall that older adults in our study made more errors in the 
control colour task than young adults, therefore, they may be having trouble deciding 
whether the figure is coloured or shaded during the switching task.  The forced switching 
task in our study requires working memory capacity as participants must remember the 
instructions for the two different tasks (Task A and Task B), when they have to switch 
based on where the stimulus was presented on the screen (top vs. bottom half of the 
screen) and the two different responses necessary for each task (e.g. colour/shades of grey 
and triangle/square).  Task switching has been hypothesized to involve elimination of a 
no longer relevant task set from working memory and reactivation of current relevant task 
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set (Mayr & Kligel, 2003).  Older adults may have been using their working memory 
capacity to remember when they had to switch tasks leading to better performance in their 
switching errors.  But given their reduced working memory capacity compared to young 
adults, it may have been harder for older adults to deal with the extra load of choosing the 
right response for the task set and therefore leading to more decision errors and inhibition 
errors.  Consistent with this hypothesis, there was a positive correlation between N-back 
errors and decision errors for older adults in the visual switching task after the neutral 
mood induction, r = .40, p = .019, positive mood induction, r = .60, p < .001, and 
negative mood induction, r = .46, p = .006, suggesting that working memory capacity is 
related to decision type errors.  Similarly, significant correlations were found between 
inhibition errors in the visual task after neutral mood, r = .43, p = .011, positive mood, r = 
.54, p = .001, and negative mood, r = .61, p < .001.  In contrast, there were no significant 
correlations between N-back errors and switching type errors in the visual switching task 
for neutral and positive mood inductions; only a correlation was found with negative 
mood, r = .55, p = .001.   
Among young adults, there were no significant correlations between N-back 
errors and switch, decision and inhibition errors for verbal and visual switching task 
across mood inductions.  This suggests that older adults’ working memory capacity may 
be related to their accuracy levels during set switching tasks whereas working memory 
capacity does not appear to be related to young adults’ set switching performance.  
Working memory has been shown to be an important factor when determining the 
magnitude of age related differences in set switching (Kramer, Hahn, & Gopher, 1999) 
such as when working memory load was increased in a set-switching task, older adults 
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had greater switch costs than young adults whereas older and young adults performed 
similarly when there was less working memory demand. 
Previous studies investigating the effect of mood on executive functioning have 
rarely examined the positive mood as facilitator theory.  The current results provide 
supporting evidence for this theory.  Participants in this study were split into two groups: 
individuals with high task enjoyment, interest and motivation ratings were grouped in the 
high motivation group and individuals who rated lower task enjoyment, interest and 
motivation were grouped in the low motivation group, based on median split.  Consistent 
with the theory, following induction of a positive mood participants in the low motivation 
group showed a greater switch cost and made more switching type errors than participants 
in the high motivation group during the visual switching task.  Examination of switching 
performance between the low and high motivation groups during neutral and negative 
moods showed that there was no difference in their switching performance for switch cost 
and errors made for visual and verbal tasks, indicating that the effect was specific to 
positive mood.   
When examining older adults performances following positive and negative mood 
inductions, older adults appeared to do better in a positive mood- they had a reduced 
switch cost and improved inhibitory control in the visual switching task and made less 
inhibition errors in the verbal switching task.  This finding may be explained by the 
positive mood as a facilitator theory.  Older adults rated their mood as more positive than 
young adults after the positive mood induction.  Older adults also rated the set-switching 
task as more enjoyable, t(69) = -2.41, p = .01, r = .27, interesting, t(69) = -3.27, p = .001, 
r = . 37, and reported being more motivated, t(69) = -2.10, p = .008, r = .25, than young 
adults after the positive mood induction.  Consistent with the positive mood as facilitator 
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theory, positive mood facilitated inhibition performance in older adults because they were 
more motivated and found the task more enjoyable than young adults.  These results 
suggest that positive mood may act as a facilitator for cognitive performance if 
motivation and task interest is high.   
Lastly, this study investigated whether positive mood and negative mood 
differentially affected set switching performance based on the type of task used.  
Research shows that regionally specific, lateralized activation of brain regions relevant to 
a task is associated with better performance (Gur et al., 1994, 2000; Wendt & Risberg, 
1994); meaning that greater activation of the right hemisphere as a result of negative 
mood will produce better performance on visual tasks that also use the right hemisphere 
(visual spatial tasks).  In contrast, the greater activation of the left hemisphere as a result 
of positive mood will produce better performance on verbal tasks that also use the left 
hemisphere.  Positive mood has been found to facilitate performance on verbal working 
memory tasks but reduce performance on visual working memory tasks.  Negative mood 
has been shown to have the opposite performance pattern. However, this effect was not 
found during this study. When participants were induced in a positive mood, there was no 
difference in their switching or inhibition performance on the verbal set-switching task 
compared to their performance in a neutral mood.  When participants were induced in a 
negative mood, they performed better in the visual set-switching task compared to a 
neutral mood.  They showed a reduced switch cost and better inhibitory control under a 
negative than neutral mood.  But this effect was not specific to negative mood because 
participants in a positive mood also showed reduced switching cost and better inhibitory 
control in the visual task compared to neutral mood.  Furthermore, participants showed 
better inhibitory control in a positive mood compared to a negative mood.  Therefore, the 
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results of this study are not consistent with the idea that a regionally specific, lateralized 
activation of brain regions relevant to a task is associated with better performance.  
Limitations 
There are several potential limitations of the present findings.  First, there were 
some limitations in our sample.  Our sample of young adults was composed of university 
students and therefore the results may not generalize to other young adults in the 
community.  But past studies have found that using university students had similar effects 
to studies using participants from the general population (Baas, De Dreu & Nijstad, 
2008).  Given that older adults in our study had a fairly high education (with most 
participants having at least a university bachelor degree), it is uncertain whether our 
findings generalize to older adults with less education.  There may be a difference in the 
amount or type of mood regulation strategy used by less educated adults.  Older adults in 
this study were individuals willing to volunteer their time for research and therefore may 
be a subsample of older adults that are not representative of all older adults in the 
population, a common problem among many behavioral studies in psychology (Rabbitt, 
Lowe, & Shilling, 2001).  Also, the young and older adults may not be comparable 
groups because there were many differences between them such as English fluency, 
number of anxiety and depression-like symptoms, stress level, self- reported task 
motivation and memory performance.  Therefore, differences in task performance 
between young and older adults may be related to these extraneous factors.  
There were also some limitations regarding the study procedure.  Despite the fact 
that participants were asked to rate their mood accurately and honestly, there is a risk that 
participants may comply with reporting changes in mood that they believe the researcher 
is trying to achieve despite lack of true mood changes.  However, there is research 
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demonstrating that that demand effects do not play a central role in mood induction 
procedures (Westermann et al., 1996; Finegan & Seligman, 1995; Scherrer & Dobson, 
2009).  This study did not completely randomize the order of mood inductions; 
participants underwent the neutral mood induction first to provide a baseline.  Then 
participants were randomly assigned to either a negative-positive mood induction order or 
a positive-negative mood induction order.  This creates the possibility of practice effects 
following the negative and positive mood inductions because participants completed the 
switching task once before.  Future inclusion of a control group in which participants 
complete the computer task three times under a neutral mood induction can help to 
examine potential practice effects.  
Generally, there were few mood effects for the verbal switching task compared to 
the visual switching task among all participants.  The visual switching task performances 
had greater observed power generally than the verbal switching task performances, which 
have made it more likely to find significant results in the visual switching task. However, 
it may be that the visual and verbal tasks are not completely equivalent.  Participants took 
longer to complete the verbal switching task as indicated by greater total average reaction 
time (M = 1347. 42, SD = 404.86) compared to the visual switching task (M = 1137.00, 
SD = 411.74) when performing the switching tasks for the first time following the neutral 
mood induction, t(86) = 6.75, p < .001,.  Participants took longer to complete the repeated 
trials, t(86) = 11.40, p < .001, and the switch trials, t(86) = 11.08, p < .001, of the verbal 
switching task compared to the visual switching task.  But there was no significant 
difference in the switching cost between the visual and verbal switching tasks or 
difference in task accuracy between the two tasks.  This suggests that participants took 
longer to make the right decisions within the verbal tasks than switching between tasks.  
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It may be that the visual tasks were easier because the stimuli are more perceptually 
salient and automatically processed (shape and colour) compared to the words used in the 
verbal tasks; we do not automatically determine the number of syllables or decide 
whether the word is animate or inanimate when reading words.  The greater difficulty 
level of the verbal task may have led to reduced mood effects (Van Dillen & Koole, 
2007).  Alternatively, the difference in task performance between the visual and verbal 
switching may be a laterality issue.  Moore and Oaksford (2002) found that mood 
affected performance on a visual learning task but not on a verbal word association task.  
Verbal tasks such as processing meaning of words and decoding the number of syllables 
are associated with left hemisphere activation and the left hemisphere has been suggested 
to play a larger role in emotional modulation than the right hemisphere.  It may be that the 
activation of the left hemisphere during the verbal switching task facilitates emotional 
regulation, leading to less mood effects found in the verbal task.  
Older adults appeared to have greater difficulty on the colour task compared to 
young adults.  Vision changes related to aging such as macular degeneration, diabetic 
retinopathy and cataracts changes the sensitivity to colour and contrast perception (Birren 
& Schaie, 2001; Whiteside, Wallhagen, & Pettengill, 2006).  These vision changes may 
have affected older participants’ colour task performance and may explain their poorer 
performance on the colour control task compared to young adults.  During the control 
trials, some of the older adults reported mistakenly responding coloured to figures in 
lighter shades of grey.  This difficulty in the task set may be magnified during switching 
because older adults’ need to use greater resources to do the colour task during the visual 
switching task in comparison to young adults, thereby affecting their switching 
performance.  Research has found that perceptual processing age-related deficits become 
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON SET-SWITCHING   
 
113 
more evident when the computational load reaches a certain level of complexity (Faubert, 
2002) 
Future Directions 
 This is the first study to examine the role of mood in set switching between older 
and young adults and therefore, further studies are needed to replicate our findings.  
Given that mood regulation differences have been found between older and young adults, 
it would be helpful for future studies to interview participants to find out if they are 
regulating their mood during switching tasks and the types of strategies they are using to 
do so.  Research on set switching has identified different stages and processes.  Mayr and 
Kligel (2003) suggested two stages in task switching:  cue driven retrieval of rules for the 
task demands that involves loading current task demands from long term memory into 
working memory and the application of task rules applied once the stimuli is presented.  
Rubinstein, Meyer and Evans (2001) indicated two processes in switching- the executive 
control processes and the task response processes.  Within the executive control 
processes, there is the goal shifting stage that keeps track of current and future tasks and 
rule activation stage that enables rules for selecting current task response and disables 
rules for selecting prior task response.  It would be beneficial to examine how mood 
changes affect these different stages of set switching, for example whether mood 
inductions affect the bottom up processes such as proactive interference and negative 
priming and/or top up processes such as executive functioning aspects (e.g. inhibition, 
working memory).  Our study used an external cue of where the stimulus was presented 
on the screen to indicate which task to conduct.  It would be interesting to see whether 
participants under mood inductions perform similarly when asked to switch tasks based 
on an internal cue (such as after every three trials) or to switch tasks on their own 
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voluntarily (Arrington & Logan, 2005). 
 
Summary 
The current study results indicate that very subtle influences and changes in an 
individual’s mood, elicited by such activities as watching a brief movie clip, affect 
cognitive performance differently between young and older adults.  Small changes in 
mood in a negative or positive direction are associated with better shifting and inhibitory 
abilities in older adults as measured on forced, cued based switching tasks.  Young adults 
showed reduced set shifting abilities while in a positive mood and made more errors when 
asked to shift between two different visual tasks.  Older adults are better able to regulate 
their emotions than young adults and tend to regulate their emotions across a variety of 
situations compared to young adults (Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Carstensen, 2005).  
This constant mood regulation typically exhibited by older adults makes the regulatory 
process less effortful and takes up fewer resources (Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields, 2009).  
Despite declining functioning of the frontal lobes, older adults appeared to use life 
experiences and well developed emotional regulation skills to compensate for losses in 
executive functioning.   
Our study also found evidence that level of motivation reported by participants 
during a positive mood induction plays a role in the switching cost.  Participants in the 
low motivation group showed greater switch costs and made more switching type errors 
than participants in the high motivation group when performing a visual switch task.  
Positive mood was related to improved inhibition performance among participants 
reporting greater enjoyment for the task and higher motivation to do the switching task.  
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These results suggest that positive mood acts as a facilitator for cognitive performance 
when motivation and task interest is high.  
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Appendix A 
Mood Questionnaire 
 
On this questionnaire, there are word pairs depicting opposite feelings. On each scale, 
please circle the number that best describes the way you are feeling right now? 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 
 
 Refreshed        Tired 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 
 
 Calm         Anxious 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 
 
 Alert         Unaware 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 
 
 Positive        Negative 
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Appendix B 
Computer Task Questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following questions about the computer task you have just completed. 
There are no right or wrong answers, just answer as accurately and honestly as possible.  
 
1.  Was the computer task boring? 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 
 Not at all        Very much 
 
2.  Was the computer task difficult? 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 
 Not at all        Very much 
 
3. Did you find the computer task interesting? 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 
 Not at all        Very much 
 
4. Did you enjoy doing the computer task? 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 
 Not at all        Very much 
 
5. Did you try to do your best on the task? 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 
 Not at all        Very much 
 
6. Do you think you make lots of mistakes during the task? 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 
 Not at all        Very much 
 
7. If you did the task again, how much better do you think you would do? 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 
 Not at all        Very much 
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